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CF.APrER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important problems of the American economy 
at the present time is the conflict between capital and labor. 
The intense concern about multi-employer bargaining is one of 
the most important expressions of a gene ral apprehension about 
the conflict. 1'11 th the growing practice of multi-employer bar-
gaining , a considerable concern has been expressed that this 
particular metho d of collective bargaining tends to upset certai 
institutional arrangements which have come to be looked upon as 
an important part of the economy. The controversy about the de-
sirability or the undesirability of this special bargaining 
technique covers many questions. It is further confused by var-
ious conflicting points o f vievJ and by the use of a number of 
ntested assumptions. This thesis proposes to take into a ccount 
some of the various issues and to discuss on the basis of ernpiri 
cal re search so me of the controversial aspects of this type of 
oargaining and finally to present so me conclusions which appear 
to be evident as a result of this analysis . 
This thesis proposes to shoiV' that multi-employer collective 
argaining offers a devi ce that promotes standardized colle ctive 
argaining, reduces industrial strife and contributes materially 
o peaceful and mutually beneficial labor relations in industria 
1 th a long hi story of multi-employer bargaining . In o rder to 
evelop this hypothesis this thesis attempts to prove that not 
fest in many forms but 
also represent in their entirety a co ns iderable portion of all 
collective bargaining procedures. Order and stabilization resul 
from multi-employer bargaining and once the inherent administra-
ive problems are resolved, this t ype of barga ining can be uti -
BEneficially. It is important to ment ion at t h is point t_ t 
long with the above, there exists the possibility of divergence 
rom the most efficient allocation of resources. 
Here the au thor takes t he position that, despite the possi-
ility of divergence from the mos t efficient allocation -- of re-
sources inherent in this type of bargain ing , along with the lack 
f complete evidence, there is justification enough to support 
he hypothesis, namely, that multi-employer bargaining offers a 
ice for standardizing collective bargaining procedure and reduc 
industrial strife. 
It mi ght be well at t his time to preview brie fly t he organ-
zat ion of the t hesis so that t he re'ader will be able to see 
relat ionship between t he va rious parts o f the thesis. 
As previously mentione d_, t he purpose of Chapter 2 is to de-
and describe multi-emplo yer collective bargaining structures 
the dis cussion o f these bargaining structures the extent of 
I hese barga i ning r e l a tionships is also presented and the purpose 
·s to point out that not only are these barga ining structures 
1anifest in many different forms but represent in their entirety 
I considerable portion o f all collective bargaining agreements. 
Since the inception of multi-employer bargaining goes back 
the nineteenth century , a historica l review is presented in 
· dustries Vlith muJ ti: em: 
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agreements. Here the growth o f this type o f bargaining i n certa' 
industries is traced and the point is made that through the 
course of the history of multi-employer bargaining, order and 
stabilization have been the result of this type of bargaining 
rather than the chaotio and disturbing conditions which pre cede 
Chapter 4 involves the administration of multi-employer 
a greements and the problems encountered. The varying effects 
are pointed out o f each o f t he different types of a greements on 
wages, prices, distribution o f the l abor force and technolo gical 
innovation. The point is made that once t hese administrative 
problems are overcome, these agreements can be utilized .to bring 
about stable and o r derly industrial relations. 
Fina l ly in Chapter 5 
argaining is presented. 
a critical evaluation of multi-employe 
1 Here certain advantages and disadvanta .es 
re dis cusse d and each one in turn is criticized in the light o 
its adherence to or divergence from the most efficient allocatio 
of resources. This chapter concludes with the statement that th 
overwhelming vreight o f the evidence investigated indicates that 
once this bargaining relationship represents an equality of bar-
gaining power, it will be a valuable method of promoting indus-
trial peace. 
Chapter 6 summarizes t he t hesis br iefly; presents certain 
I 
conclusions : that indicate the advant.a.ges ~ of multi.;..employer :'bar.;. :-· 1·., 
gain ing , and points out certain implications as a result of the 
investigation~ 
Certain methods, arbitrary in choice, were employfSd, and it 
ight be in order to mentio.n briefly reasons for their use. In 
3 
presenting the various bargaining structures it was necessary 
because of limitations of space to discuss the ones that are 
most prominently in existence, to the exclusion of others. This 
technique was also necessary in the choice of industries covered 
lby the historical revie11, and yet a gain in the chapter where e-
valuation of selected advantages and disadvantages \vere presentee . 
In rna kin g these choices, tvm criteria were employed : (1) a 
sufficiently long period of experience with these selections, 
and (2) a wi de variation in the economic circumstances and ex-
periences "rith these choices so that instructive analysis could 
be made . 
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CH.~PTER 2 
T ~::E CKI\EACTERIST ICS AJ:JD SXTENT O:'J MULTI~Ef'IPLOu:;R BARGAINING 
The purpose of this chapter is: 1) to define and describe 
types of employer collective bargaining structures; 2) to point 
out the extent of multi-employer bargaining relationships in 
America; and 3) to show that not only are these bargaining str ctures 
manifest in many different forms but represent in their entirety 
a considerable portion of all collective bargaining agreements. 
I 
In current discussions of the problems raised by multi -em-
ployer bar·gaining there is a tendency to focus attention on cer-
tain spectacular issues and in so doing neglect other important 
aspects. These multi-em Dloyer bargaining systems can be grouped. 
into specific classifications such as industry-wide, company-
wide and r~gion- or city-wide. Along with these types, we have 
other classifications which cannot be stratified into classes 
but which are worthy of discussion. In this group, we include 
bargaining on the wage-leader principle, the form contract type 
of bargaining, and multi-industry bargaining. 
To insure a rounded and balanced view it is necessary to 
define clearly what industry-wide bargaining entails. The first 
type defined is the industry-wide bargaining structure, and sine 
this type is the most important it merits greater consideration 
than the other types. Bargaining is industry- wide when negoti-
ations are conducted by two negotiating bodies, one of which on 
the workers ' side represents, either by formal or informal auth-
prization, a majority of all employees within the industry, or a 
~ajority of all employees in a particular category of wor k, and 
the other of which on the employers' side r epresents, either by 
formal or informal authorization, a majority of all firms and 
plants in the industry •1 Since \'le have the general definition, 
attention should be turned to those aspects of the def:inition re-
quiring further clarifica tion. 
The aspects to be discussed in considering the scope and ex-
tent of industry-wide bargaining are: the number of people em-
played, the issues to be covered, the firms to be covered in the 
employer groups and finally the t ype of union structures that 
lend themselves to industry-wide bargaining . 
In discussing the bargaining au tho r ity it is important to 
remember that t he majority cannot be considered too specifically, 
since certain percentages of the workers and t he employers may 
be a ppropriate for s ome i ndustries or job cate gories, and another 
fi gure for others. Thus, in certain industries li ke fur goods, 
differences i n size s of firms are not extreme but in othe slike 
flat glass t he contrast is qu ite sharp and i t is difficult to ap-
ply a fixed percentage test, either in terms of numbers of em~ 
ployees or number of firms·. This may better be illustrated by 
sao'\...,ring how i n fur manufacturing , firms employing ten workers or 
less are considered to employ the great majority of emplo yees, 
while in flat glass, tv10 firms (Pittsburgh Plate Gl a s s and Libby-
0\-Jens-Ford Glass) employ about 15,000 "'vorkers as apposed to about 
1. Pierson, Frank c., 11ulti-Employer Bargaininp;, Nature and Scon~. 
Unive r sity of Pennsylvania Press, Penn., 1948. p.9. 
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~2,500 in the "Little Glass" group of firms. 
~aile some cases seem to rest on the border line this cri-
of whe re lines may be drawa. 
Negotiations since 1927 have been conducted betv1een the 
Full-Fashioned Hos iery Nanufacturers of America and the American 
Federation of Hosiery r,'V'o.rkers and in turn the National Labor A-
greements have covered a ma jor part of the northern sections of 
this branch of the indus t ry.l But of approximately fo ur hundred 
hosiery plants in the country a considerable amount are located 
in the south and b y 1946 southern production had increased to 
forty-five per cent of the total. Since most of the plants in 
the southern part of t he industry are today non-union, less than 
one-third of the mills had agreements with labor unions which 
covered more than one-half of their employees. 2 In accordance 
with our accepted criterion, 1 t v.rould seem as though bargaining 
in this branch of the industry cannot be considered as being on 
an industry-wide basis. 
But in the pottery industry a contrary conclusion may be 
drawn. In 1 946 the biennial agreement signed by the National 
Brotherhood of Operative Potters r epresenting the vwrkers and 
the United States Potters representing the employers covered 
1. Lester, Richard A., and Robie, Ed'~:vard A., ~vap:es under Nationa 
and Regional Collective Bar~aining. Industrial Relations Sec1 
tion, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1946. p.43. 
2. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, ':'1/'ai<:e S t ructure 
Studies, Series 2, Number 32, 1946. p.3. 
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rbout eighty per cent of the employees in the general ware branc 
pf the ind.ustry .1: Although a few large companies have r emained 
put.side the Association, most of them have a s reements \'lith the 
brotherhood generally conforming to th·3 viage rates contB:-ined in 
he national agreem8nt. Thus this would seem t.o come within the 
[
erms of our definition of ind.ustry-1vide bargaining . 
In terms of the scope of bargaining it is wise to consider 
1 hat the issue or issues will cover in order to understand t he 
~ure of industry-wide bargaining. In certain industries, such 
·Tailroads, what the industry-wide bargaining consists of is a sin 
I 
~le issue; that is, the amount wage rates are to be increased. 
In fact, most instances of industry-wide bargaining s eem to have 
imited themselves t o this s ingle issue. But this seems perfect-
y valid since it is usually assumed that bargaining on such a 
arge basis affects either directly or indirectly labor costs. 
It may well be that i ':: sues su ch as seniority rights, grievances 
nd fringe issues are involved but these usually are found in lo-
cal a greements rather than industry-wide agreements. Considera-
tion must be given to the danger t hat ce rtain issues, which shoul 
~e confined to local or individual treatment, are sometimes dealt 
Lith on an industry-wide basis and as such raise new problems. 
hen again, it may happen t hat wage rates are handled by an in-
ustry-wide basis but t he job rates are handled at the plant lev-
1. The important considera tion is to get that t ype of agreement 
,!ihich \•Till facilitate bargain ing and make for sound agreement. 
There seems to be cons iderable difficulty in determinin g the 
1. Lester and Robie .21. 
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boundaries of certain industries, so as to def~e the industry. 
A problem arises when the same contra ct provisions are applied tc 
~:Drms ma king different products for diff"erent mar kets, using dif-
ferent methods of production or even different types of labor. 
Therefore it is important to determine, not only Hhat issues are 
to be handled on the industry-wide basis but also what firms 
should be included in the industry gr oup. 
It does not present a problem to the bargaining authorities 
V<Jhen dealings vr i t h a si ven union are all conducted throu gh one 
employer association which any one firm is free to join or not. 
Under this consider ation, it can be assumed that a firm would not 
join the group unles s it considered itself in the same industrial 
cate gory. This doe s not necessarily confine the employer's asso-
ciations 1-vhich bargain vl i th t he unions to one industry. Sometime~ 
it is possible that the employer group includes firms from a wide 
variety of frdustries or the same r esu lt may be a chieved by draw-
ing together separa te employer gr oups into a federation with a 
top body performing t he bargaining function. Certain e mployer 
groups set up in many cities to deal vTith the Teamsters Union 
are examples o:' the inter-industry type of organization 'T.'lhile the 
San Francisco Employers' Council is an example of the Federation 
type .1 In the >:Jay the term is used here this can hardly be 
called industry-wide bargaining. Actually it is what may be cal ~d 
union-wide bargaining where the union seeks to apply uniform con-
tract provisions to employers whose operations may or may not be 
L~ Pierson, Frank c., op. cit., p.l2 ff. 
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homogeneous . 
The difficulty is that there is no ' clear or generally ac-
cepted basis for deciding vlhat t he limits of a given employer 
group should be. This may crea te a situation where certain~irms, 
who are allowed to pay below union scale on the ground.s that 
their operations are not comparable to. the hi gher-paying group, 
may have a competitive advantage which they are not entitled to 
and still further might undermine the entire 1...;age structure of 
the agreement . 
Complications arise due to the fact t hat the union tends to 
look at the problem in terms of the t ype of labor or wor k involved, 
whereas employers tend to emphasize product d ifferences and com-
petitive market r e l a tionships. Still further ramificat ions may 
be seen in the more important unions, such as the United Mine 
Workers, Unit ed Steelworkers , United Electt'ical itlorkers and 
others similar, where the union's jurisdiction covers more than 
a single employer group. As a matter of fact, the United Mine 
vlorhers, who at first glan ce appear to be a single employer ca te-
gory, namely coal pro ducers, turn out to encompass a number of 
groups, each of which has its own peculiar mar ke ting and pro-
duction problems. This, in tul''n, brea ks d01.-m t o subdivisions of 
anthracite and bituminous coal 1•rith their own employer groups, 
and in turn is still fur t her subdivided between mines ovmed by 
steel co mpanies as c ompared to commercial mines .l 
1. Pierson, Frank c., op. cit., p.l4. 
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Still another consideration is the failure to extend stan-
ards far enough which may cause as much trouble as extending 
overage too far. Since 1900, the ~~nufacturer's Protective and 
eveloprnent Association and the Interna tional ~Iolders and Foundry 
vorkers Union had an agreement that covered over sixty per cent o , 
he industry 's output. This percentage has declined so far that 
n 1946 les s than twen t y per cent was covered by the Association. 
l he national agreement is confined mostly t o the Stove Foundry 
ranch of the industry alone, since the union failed to organ ize 
b1ants using sheet metal fabrication as opposed to those using 
ast iron. Now Vlith gas, oil and electricity compet ing success-
' ully with coal and 1iJo od in heating equipmen t, the old-fashioned 
~ron s t ove finds itself relegated to a subordinate position in 
tl he industry. Thus the union, whose a greement covers mostly the I . 
tove foundry industry , has had considerable difficulty in main-
~aining employment standards. Only by bein g able to extend its 
~urisdiction to those new producing groups, utilizing s heet metal 
I 
' abrication, can the union gain the degree of uniformity it de-
~ ires. 
Certain conclusions become apparent "~rlhen defining the indus-
ry to be covered. The industry~wide basis of bargaining is pos-
· ible and still may be confined to a narrow, homogeneous group of 
~ irrns. This is the example shown by the foundry branch of the 
~ tove industry. Then we face the problem of jurisdiction of un-
ions extendLng over a heterogeneous number of employer groups, 
1. Lester and Robie, op. cit., p.32. 
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j here unions try to apply uniform conditions on all of them. 
Here the complication arises because the union t ries to treat the 
~ndustry groups as though t hey formed a single unified 11hole. 
r t t his po i nt it seems obvious that if the unions would confine 
Lhe bargaining to genuine industry groups so that each employer 
. roup would represent its owr. members in negotiations with the 
l nion,many difficulties would be dissolved. As a final opinion, 
it would seem as t hou gh t he re is no s pe cific formula, v·Thereby 
these matters can be resolved, since it is rarely clear just 
where t he lines between different bargaining groups should be 
dra~m.l The union, qu ite naturally, is interes ted in the com-
parability of jobs, 1.r1hile the management's view is emphasized in 
comparability of pro du ct and competitive selling rela tionships. 
Another i mpor tant cons ide r a tion is the t ype of union struc-
t ure and hoi¥' it l ends itse l f to industry-wide bargaining. This 
is in terms of craft or industrial structure. He re important di 
ferences may ar ise s ince, 11hen bargaining on the industrial basi 
the employers vlill bargain with a union re presenting nearly a ll 
the workers in t hat industry. On the other hand, i t is quite 
different to bargainwith a craft union where t he union consists 
of only the workers in a particular craft or group of crafts. 
Yet accordin g to the criterion we accepted previously, both are 
considered to be example s of i ndustry-vv ide bargaining. Generall 
single-craft bargaining fo r _an ent ire industry is comparatively 
rare, and for our purposes may be l eft out. What must be con-
sidered are t hose craf t-unions vlhich bargain on a regional or 
12 
local-area basis , whic h is more the r u le. 
' Organizations formed on craft lines may easily Join to gether 
"T,vhere their interests woul c, compel common action and thus i ndus-
try-vJide bargaining is made feasible . An example of this vlOuld 
be the railroad industry vlhere the five operating unions have 
condu cted joint ne gotiations with the Class I railroads separate-
ly from the non-operatin :: unions, but at ot ~1.er times both grou ps 
have bande d together t hrough the Railway Labor ~xecutive's As-
sociation and ne gotiated directly with a committee of the Ameri -
can Association of ?,ai lroads.l Still it seems as thou gh the in-
dustrial form of or gani zation l ends itself more easily to prob-
lems on t he industry -wide basis. He re the union is able to ne-
gotiate for all the workers in one industry and in so doing pre-
sents a unified structure o f ·workers banded to gether in the com-
mon interests. In this part icular case perhaps it is better that 
the e mployers use barga inJng on a n industry-wide basis since the:y 
present a common front a nd are more a ble to deal with the union 
on equal terms rather than let t hemselves be put in the position 
o f individual bargaining and a l low the possibility of being 
pic ked off one by one. 
IJ: 
Since this paper . deals vlith ·,mult.i-employer bargaining it 
would not be complete itTi thout a discuss ion of other bargaining 
systems that closely approximate industry-wide bargaining . The 
other t ypes of multi-employer bargaining that are to be discu.ssec 
1. Pierson, Frank C., ~_cit., p.l7. 
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lin order are: com pany..,.wide and re g ional bargaining , via ge leader 
oargaining , "form" contract bargaining and finally multi-industry 
[bargaining . 
I'he first o f t he s e t ype s wh ich hav e c haracteristics similar 
to industry-vtide bargainin g t ypes is company-wide bargaining . It 
~ust be reme mbered t ha t · in this day of t he large corporation, 
~he re each ope rate a number of plants, it becomes d iff icult to as 
certain whethe r bargaining s hould be on a company-wide or a n in-
~1vidual-plant basis. It s eems t ha t 1<1he re the business is large 
~nd repre sents a large part of the in dustry's output, t he issue 
involves many of the same problems that are included in connectio 1 
iW i t h industry- vJ ide s ystems. 
In t h is multi-plant situation, the question arises i'lhether 
some of the issues can be handled on a multi-plant basis. 1 It is 
~afe to say that the large multi-plant corporation constitutes a 
strong influence for centralized uniform treat~ent of problems in 
tl.abor relation s. It then f ollo\vs t hat top manage ment of the typ-
ical large corporation or enterprise will be sure to retain a 
large amount o f controi over major policy questions and. in order 
!to maintain t h is ·position could not · do otherwise. This would in-
elude s u ch major issues not normally cove red b y union a greements, 
~uch as pensions and. profit-sharing schemes. 
Just as in industry-wide bargaining it is the usual practice 
~o distinguish be t ween those issues to be handled on the top lev-
~1 as opposed to t h ose han d l e d on the local p lant level. Usually 
1. Pierson, Frank C., op. cit., p .l9. 
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~ajor policy questions are kept on the top level, as, for example, 
1what issues management will or will not bargain about, what oper-
~ting area will be covered by a particular agreement, or ~'lhether 
~nion recognition will be granted and , if so, in v1hat form. Agaip. 
as in the i n dustry-\vide types, plans affecting general employee 
security such as group insurance, pensions, and emplo yment sta-
bilization programs are usually handled on a company-wide basis. 
On the othe r hanc1 , bargaining over s u ch issues as discharge , lay-
off, and rehire procedures is frequently handled on a local 'f'plant 
basis. The 11age and hour issue : is usually dealt · \v i th on e ither 
level, dependin s on the r elat ive i mportan ce of the question in-
:Volved. Therefore bargaining over general wa ge changes is many 
I 
times handled on a company-\'Tide basis wh ile change s in hour sched1-
ules, ind ividua l v1ages, are settled at the departmental or plant 
l evel. As far as job evaluation plans and wage inecentive schemee, 
there is considera ble variation, since eome companies leave it to 
local plant settlemen t while others delegate it to the central 
headquarters. 
Althou gh there is much to show t hat t here is considerable 
. centralization of control over major policy questions in labor 
problems, it does not necessarily folloi-7 that top management in 
multi-plant corpora tions '\•Jish to usurp the authority of local 
plant mana ge rs. In many cases compan ies try to follovr a policy of 
keeping wa ges in line 1vith local area or community leve ls, and 
thus place a large responsibility on local plant management. 
In many cas e s, ,,,rhere policies have for one reason or another 
been p l aced on a company-wide basis, care has senerally been ta kep. 
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to give local plant management a voice in determining the com-
pany's position and to ma ke sure the men who are go ing to admin-
ister the policy are fully equipped to do so. Still, despite 
importan t similarities, the fact of com~on ovmership and what is 
perhaps of more i mportance, the aspects of common management set 
off company-v1ide bargaining from multi-employer systems such as 
those of t he industry-wide t ype discussed previously . Vfi th com-
pany-vlide bargaining , in r egard to the more i mportant l a bor rela 
tions policy there is one, representative of mana gement and for 
the employer only on interest involved. Taking into considerati 
the local problems and differences, it follows that dealings be-
tvreen unions and multi-plant enterprise rest on a similar basis, 
especially where one union represents the great bulk of the com-
pany's employees. 
In addition to bargaining on an indus t ry-wide and company-
wide basis, union and employe r dealings ma y be con ducted in term 
of r egions, local areas, or individual plants . 1 As in the case 
of industry-wide bargaining, the dis tinction between these bar-
gaining types depends primarily on who is represented by the 
spokesman f or the two parties and ivhat pro portion of t he indus-
try in t he area is cove red. It may be said that ne gotiations ar 
on a local-area basis when the bargaining representatives s pea k 
for a majority of an industry's employers and/or employees in a 
given communit y or locality. In turn, bargaining beco mes re gion 
vvhen the coverage goes beyond a local area. Ae;a in as in the cas 
of the other types of barga ining it becomes difficult to dr avl a 
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clear-cut line. By use of examples it may be possible to sho-v; tre 
difference. 1!.'here, for example , , firms in the service trade are 
unionized, as in the larger communities, bargaining usually is on 
a city-wide or metro p6litan basis. This is true, for instance, 
of bargaining i n hotels, laundries, groceries, bakeries, buildine· 
service and others. Local area examples may be found in such di-
verse industries as build ing construction, printing , pattern mak-
ing , dental laboratories, foundries, retail furniture and many 
others. 
In some . cases there are industries vlhe re comp9titive rela-
tionships between firms cov er a geographical area wider than a 
single community or locality. Here bargaining vlill tend to be 
region-vJide in c'b..aracter . This widening of competitive influences 
is well brought out b y the experience of the women's clothing in-
dustry in New York City .l Once the employer bargaining group 
was c onfined to the metropolitan area. To day the contract be-
tv·leen t he £iierchants' Ladies' Garment Association and the Interna-
tional Ladies ' Garment ~vorkers ' Union covers "the city of New York 
and all such cities and to"Vms in the State of New Yor k , New Jer-
sey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania in ~>Ihich garments are being 
manufactured by or for members of the Association or other manu-
facturers, j obbers, or wholesalers do ing business in Ne\"1 York 
City." This tendency for city-'rJ ide bargaining to cover broader 
geogra phical areas and thus to develop into regional systems is 
apparent in a number of industries . A good example is the curren 1u 
1. Pierson, Frank C., op. cit., p.23. 
17 
----------~----
a greement be t"~:Teen the Toledo Association of :f..la.ster Plumbers and 
the Plumbers' Union, vlhi ch covers e leven co.unties i n t he re g i on of 
. Toledo, Ohio. In dealing \-lith t he molde rs' union, the Miami Val-
ley Foundrymen 's Associa tion repr·2sents t•111enty companies scatterefi 
over six cities in Ohio and two companies in Covington, Kentucky. 
It might be possible for the bargaining to cover a singl e distric ~ 
within a state as in the shoe indust r y of southeastern Massachu-
set ts, or the food industry of wes tern Ne1t1 Yori{. In some in-
stances the em:_Jloyer group may be state-wide in its representatic p. 
as in t he ca s e of the Timmer Producers' As socia tion of Minnesota 
or the Montana Contractors Association. Other well-lmown exam-
ples of intrastate or interstate re gional bargaining structures 
are to be found in t rucking , meat pac king , beer d istribution, 
photoengraving , and coal mining. 
Coal mining i s a goo d example of hov1 d ifficult 1 t is to try 
to distinguish between different barga ining t ypes , since on some 
issues ne gotia tions in bituminous coal have been handled on an 
indu s try- i'ride bas is, vihile other matters have been handled re-
gionally .l Thus bargaining can be in nart indu stry~w ide, in 
part re gi ona l, an d in part on a local area or even individual 
plant basis. ·rhe bar gain ing s tructu r e s in d ifferent i ndustries 
1
vary widely on this s cope. 
It can be seen that the classification of a given situation 
depends essentially on the bargaining area covered b y contract 
1. ·Fisher, itlaldo E., Collective :Bargaining in t he Bituminous 
Coal Industry: An Appraisal. Unive rsity of Pennsylvania 
Press, Penn., 1948. p. 27. 
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fn. egotiations. In industry-wide systems, the jurisdiction of the 
two pargaining representatives is correspondingly narr owed. Com-
pany- wide, region-wide, and city-wide systems stand midway be-
tvleen these t\vo extremes. 
At this point, it is important to d iscuss othe r types of 
multi-employer bargaining. These t ype s cannot be classified un-
der industry- wide, company-,,T ide, and re gion or city-wide a gree-
ments, but still must be considered under multi-employer types of 
collective bargaining. 
In the case of indus try-\-Tide, region-wide, and ci t y- ,,1 ide sys 
t erns it may be that t he employers a s well as t he worke rs are or-
ganized in bargaining groups and , at lea st as tt concerns the 
re gional or local-area systems, it sometimes happ~ns that the em-
ployers are even organ ized on an inter-industry basis. Most of 
the time, ho VT 3Ver, employers are not organ ized and under these 
circumstances only one s ide, the union, may ba rgain on an indus-
try-vJide, re gional or local-area bas is. Bargaining of this type 
is found so often in American indust r y that it is import3.n t to 
mention. 
One-sided bargaining syst ems of this t ype are oft en built on 
uhe wage-leader principle wher·3 the terms of t he a greement reache~ 
by a union and a particular firm or relatively small employer 
group are· usually followe d b y most other firms in the industry or 
.uhe area. It is also possible for firms to f ollow a v-1age leader 
~ven thou gh there is no union i n the industry. 
Contract changes based on the wage-leader 
'an entire i ndustry or they may be limited to a 
principle may cover 
particular re g ion 1\ 
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or community. ·rhe one difference fro m the other s ystems is that 
the employers, unlike the employees, are not organized. and there-
fore are not repre sented by a singl e spokesman. Good examples of 
this t ype of bargaining are the mass production industries like 
steel, automobiles, and electrical equipment. Most notable are 
the craft unions whe r e a single organization cuts across a num-
ber of industries in a given area and i t is usually these unions 
"~:l hich have been good exampl 9s of the 1,..,ra ge leader principle. 
In many cases it is difficult to distinguish between bar-
gaining with employers as a group and bargaining on the wage lead-
er principle. From this situation problems ar ise where the em-
ployers have authorized a spokesman to represent them in dealings 
with the unions, but where t here is no clear-cut proof o f the 
authorization. Ih the woolen and worsted industry, for example, 
a preliminary negotiations conference is usually held between 
representatives of about 170 woolen companies and the Textile 
'V'Torkers 1 Union of America, but fevl a greements are reached at this 
stagp of the proceedings.1 Ne go tiations are then held between 
the uni on and the American 11/'oolen !Jompany and more recently, v.1i tt 
this company, the Botany \'Tors ted Company, and t he Forstmann W'ool-
en Company as a group. 'rhe adjustments agreed upon have then bee:1. 
incorporated in a greements reached with other union emplo yers in 
the industry and have been followed by a number of non-union firns 
as viell. Even thou gh no formal employer-association bargaining 
is involved, the facts seem to indicate t hat the employer spo kes-
1. Pierson, Frank C., op. cit., p.28. 
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man repre sents othe r firms in the i Edustry in everyth ing rut name, 
and that t her2fore bargainin g goes beyond the vtage -leader type of 
situation. ~et, since it. a ppears thatthe initial ~ettlement 
applied to a majorit y of wor ke rs in ce rta in regions on l y and not 
to the industry as a \1hole, bargaining i n this instan ce should be 
thought of as re g i on-wide, not industry -wide, in character. 
The meat pac king industry is a good example of bargaining 
approaching the indus t. ry~wide type on an informal, if pe rhaps 
narrow basis. Here certain a greements af f ecting a large number 
of wo r kers n sgotiated by the Unite d Packing House \IJorkers of A-
merica and b y Amalgamated f'Ieat Cu:tters and Butcher Vlorkmen of 
North Am rica, coverin,s various plants of the four largest cor-
porations i n the industry, have expired on the same day e a ch 
yea r for s everal years . Ad j ustments in the general level of 
\"lages b y the "Big Four 11 pac ke rs are also usually uniform, althou gh 
the a greements are s igned by t he firms s eparately. 
The l eathe r trade is another clear example o f bargaining on 
the wage-leader principle. 1 In the indust r y , the master a s ree-
ment between some t went y if,assachusett s manufacturers and t he In-
ternational Fu r and Leathe r ~r!orkers Union has become the pattern 
for a number of " ind ividual contracts in :r.::a.ssachuse tts as v1e ll as 
other states . This is contrary t o t he proce du re used in the 
1-'!00len and worsted i ndustry , since t here is no evidence t o shoi<J 
that in leather the I·~assachusett s e mployer group is authorized 
to s peak for o t he r firms in the i ndustry . 
1 . Brown, Leo c., Union ?oli·cies in the T.eather Industry. Har-
va rd Unive r sity Press, cambridge, 1947. pp.l 87, 191. 
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Sometimes, in order· to reach an informed decision on t he 
atter, it is necessary to inquire i n to all the facts, both v-;i th 
to previous practice and present procedure; although the 
ature of t he bargaining relationship may not be too clear. A 
good example of thi s is the steel industry. 1 Here t here is no 
employer as so c i a t ion to bargain with the ~Jni ted Steeh·w r ke rs nor 
is t her s any conclusive evidence that one firm or group has been 
authorized to speak for the industry in dealings l'li th t h e union. 
f et, ever since terms were a ste e d to by the lin ited Steal>lorkers 
and the 0nited States Steel Corporation, they have, with a fe"1 
bxcept ions, been incorporated in agreements vli th the rest of the 
ndustry . Also, as has been n oted, the same wage adjustments hav 
sua.lly been made throu ghout the i ndustry at t he same time even 
-ibefore the steelworkers' union won bargaining rights. It might 
e argued on the basis of these facts that members of t he basic 
teel indus t ry are in '3- ctualit y represented by the United States 
teel Corporation in contract negotiations v-ri th the United Steel-
·mrkers and that bargaining in this industry should be considered 
I n an indsutry-;,.;ide basis. But viithout actual proof t hey must be 
classi f ied in the 1:1a ge -1eader cate go ry. 
One conclu sion vvou l d be that the recent history o f collectiv 
argaining i n the basic steel industry makes it quite clear that 
standard multi-employer wage policy may readily be developed 
n the absence of formal industry-wide bargaining . 2 I'his follov-7-
I ll. . Golden, Clinton, and Ruttenberg Harold J., The D;ynamics of In-
l dustrial Democracv. Harper & Brothers, N.Y., 1942. Chapter .X, pp.295-3lo . • I'a lor Ge or ~e - \1 . Preface 1'1 ove Co l ;;l ctiye Ba _a._in.in_g n........±Jle 
Steel Industry9 Unive r sity of Pennsylvania Press, Penn., 1948. 
p. (iv) . 
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the -leader policy in the setting of 1:1a ges was not t he invention 
of the United Stee l workers nOl'" of the United .States Steel Corpor-
ation. It seems unlikely .that it is a plot b y the bi g against 
the little . I t would seem as t hough t he economics, ge ography , 
and traditions of t he steel industry have all exerted strong 
pres s ures tovvard uniform i ty and in terre la t ion of movement in re-
gar d to the terms of emplo yment . 
Cl osely related to the wa ge-leader technique not only in 
purpose but also in :oe t ho d and result s is the · use of the "form 11 
contract. 'I'he International Brotherhoo d of Teamsters, for exam-
ple , often uses thi s technique to maintain similar conditions of 
employment on t ruc kin g operations. 1 Using this m ~t ho d , individu-
a l employers are as ked t o s ie;n a greements that are ident leal in 
every de t ail , t hus maint aining uniform employment standards for 
the 11or k . This technique is usually f ound Hhere the f irms are 
small or wher the workers represented by a particular union in 
any one firm are very fe1-1 in number. rJnder these cond itions us-
ing the form contra ct helps to solve V!hat might otheri•Tise b~ a 
difficult bargaining problem for the union . Normally, the area 
o f standar dization covered by a part icular form c ontra ct is con -
fined to a s i n 5l e city or local area as in the case of contracts 
cove ring four hundred barqer s ho ps in St . Louis, sixty-five loca., 
truc king firms in Cincinnati, fifty-nine tool and. die shops in 
~icago, and score s of movie theaters in dozens of larger c i ties.2 
,1. Feinsinger, Nathan P ., Colle ctive Bar~ain in~ in the T~Qking 
Industry. Un iversity o f Pennsylvania Pr ess , Penn. , 1949. p.l • 
2. Pierson, Frank C., op. cit., p . 30 . 
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There vrould. be little difficulty t heoretically in applying a for] 
contract to an entire indust r y but it still would. not be re garde 
as an example of industry-wide barsaining a.s long as t ~ere was 
n o employed spokesman au thorized to s peak f or the industry. 
Still another type of bargaining which is similar to indus-
try- wid.e bargaining is that of multi-industry bargaining. This 
can b est be exemplified by the San Francisco EmployeDs' Council. 
l'he San :?ranc isco ':!::mployers' Cou..ncil is a combination of a large 
variety of industrial associations and si~gle emplo yers banded 
i; to gether . to give a unite d. front to the unions in the area . In 
the Council are 2,000 employers, repre senting nearly every im-
portant industry and plant in the area . The Council's original 
purpose was primarily defensive, an attempt to restore the bal-
ance of power the ir members v-;ere losing to the union. The Coun-
cil immediately . used the master a greement as a bargaining device 
This agreement is a r rived at between a union and all the employ-
ers i'r i th vrhom the union n egotiates. The bargaining is done by 
members of t he Council. Jurisdiction over the ~ctual signing of 
the contract is remove d from the hands of the ori ginal employer 
and given to the Council . 
The Council found throughexperience that the union tactic 
of playing one 'firm against the o ther, or 11\-rhipsa\'Iing, 11 could be 
used by a smart union during the life of the contract as well as 
at the bargaining table. ·The Council v1as eager to eliminate thi 
tactic and realized the need for a continuous advisory service 
l. Chalmers, 1tT. :~:alison, and. McEachron, Scott, r<Ias ter Ap:reements 
in Collec~ive Bargalnin~ . University of Il linois Bulletin, 
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for the member companies. To fill this need, the Council estab-
lished full-time committees to handle the various prob l ems com-
ing out of t he day-to-da y operation s of the member firms. Since 
then the Council has been able to coordinate the industrial rela-
tions policies of its member companies to su ch an extent that a 
union has not been able to exercise \.·Jhipsaw tactics. 
Ori ginally one of the problems the Council me t v1as the ten-
denc y of some of its members to make separate arr angements with 
1
a union. ~ployer associations trie:i to use the bond me t hod to 
~eet this problem. Each me mber puts up a large bond which ·is 
fo~feited if t he firm brea ks a way : ro m the association or begins 
any type of action that 1:voul d undermine t he inte rests of the rna-
jori ty. The Sa n Francisco Council felt that it 110uld be better 
I 
to rely on the povler of unfaVjorable publicity lvhich 1 t could d irect 
at the rebelling me mber. This ·v1as soon s b ovm to be successful 
when one of t he lea ding hotels i n t h e area was influenced to re-
consider its decision t J leave t he association after the Council 
lSed t h is pre s s ure. This type of disciplinary action has not 
peen use e very often but it does show that if the need arises the 
Council can u se strong pressure to keep the members in line. It 
may seem undemocratic but this seems to be the only wa y to lceep 
~he strength of the Council unite d s o as to be able to face the 
~nion on equal status. 
The San Francisco experiment seems to be success f ul for both 
the employer and the union. In turn, it seems as though public 
interest has not been harmed. 'rhere has been no indication that 
\the employer and em ployees have been viOr king to gether to raise 
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wages and pass th9 additional expense on to the public . Nor has 
there been any objection raised to the system ·by the small em-
ployer because hi s voice has been drowned out by the larger mem-
bers in the employers' group. l\~any small employers feel that 
they are able to get more consideration through t he organization 
than they would have otherwise when they wou l d have been forced 
to follo v: the lead of the larger corporations. 
The San Francis co area experience is significant mnce it or-
ganizes the employers in an association tr~t is 1rlider than the 
traditional craft or ind.ustry limits ·within the area . It covers 
so me 2,000 employers in t hat a r ea vlho are enga ged in a Hide vari-
ety of bu siness activity. In addition, it establishes a pattern 
that ha s been significant in guiding the employers in such ci tie:: 
as Oakland, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Reno towards establish ing 
similar systems. An employers' council similar to t he one devel-
oped in San Francisco has been organized in northern California, 
and recentiy a Pacific Coast Council has been put into operation 
on an experimental basis. 
Ln conclusion, it must be pointed out that the San Franciscc 
Employers' Council ~tJas create d to encourage and to aid multi-em-
ployer bargaining . No theoretical reason prompted it but just 
the desire to dissipate the great disadvantages faced by the em-
ployers in single-plant bargaining on t •. 1,e west coast, where they 
had to deal Hith affiliates of strong national unions and they 
felt that their 0\tffi bargaining position \oJas vleak. r!J:ulti-industr~ 
bargaining was found to be a practical way of reaching an equality 
of bargaining power wh ich is conducive to a greements rather than 
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strikes. Thus through the use of master agreements, conditions 
of employment were stabilized and wbipmwin g tactics, on bOth the · 
upswing and the do~mswing of business, were minimized. 
III 
A general review of the extent of industry-wide bargaining 
in American indust ry, supplemented by statistics in the Appendix 
seems appropriate at this time to point out the ap-:Jroximate ex-
tent of this type of bargaining. 
Early in 1947 it \vas estimated that more than four mill ion 
1workers ~ere covered by a greements negotiated bet1<1een trade unior s 
and formal or informal employer groups. 1 This estimate included 
agreements signed by separate employers 1-<li th the same union, un-
less the~e 1-.ras evidence of negotiations with a group er committee 
of employers. As was mentioned before i n the discussion of 1r1age-
leader and form-contract situations , agreements may be identical 
as between firms even vrhen negotiated separately, and employers 
may bargain as a group ev:en though there is no clear-cut evidencE 
of concerted action. Thus it vwuld seem that this estimate undex-
estimates rather than overes timates the amount. If we use this 
figure as a base then it ~rmuld seem that multi-employer action il: 
far more wides pread than supposed. For percentage estima tes, it 
has been estimated that the number of all v1orkers under all type~: 
of agreements is approximately fifteen million. Thus , nearly 
1. United States Bureau of Labbr Statistics, "Extent of CollectivE 
Bargaining ancl Union Recognition ," Monthly Labor Review, vol.61, 
no.5, May 1947, p.66. 
• 
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twenty-seven per cent of the total are under multi-employer agre -
ments. 1 
This figure is not necessarily the r e sult of the inclusion 
of a fevJ large industries in the heavy manufacturing field. The 
only large-scale manufacturing industry in which multi-employer 
argain~ng covers as many as sixty per cent of the vlOr kers is 
shipbuilding. In 1947 group employer bargaining covered less th 
twenty per cent of all workers in such important manufacturing 
industries as automobiles, electrical equipment, meat packing, 
nd basic steel, even though more than sixty per cent of the ilvor: 
ers in these fields were organized. This sho1.;s that multi-emplo'-
er bargaining is about equally divided betHeeD ma"rlufacturin s 
and non-manufacturing industries in terms of employee coverage a 
to name a feN exampl e s is used predominantJy in st1ch widely diver 
fields as coal, clothing , cons t ruction, trucking and malt liquor • 
If v.fe look at the picture in terms of the three main t ypes 
jo f multi-employer bargaining sys terns: indus t ry-ivide, regior1-wid , 
and local or city-vJide it becomes more signif-icant. There are 
nly eight industries or trades i n the country in which bargaini 
can be said to be on an industry-wide basis: railroads, coal, 
glass, pottery, s t ove-ma king, wall-paper, elevator installation 
nd re pair, and insta.Uation of automatic sprinklers. The number 
of production e mployees comes to about a little over t ~w million, 
nd railroads and coal account for about ninety per cent of the 
total. 2 In all eight cases, unions and employers have had a long 
1. See appended tables. 
2. See appended tables. 
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history of mutual dealings, although the jurisdiction and. · some-
times the identity of the union and. employer groups have in some 
instances varied considerably over that time. 
In contrast to industry-wide bargaining, deal ings on a re-
gional basis are typical of a considerable number of industries 
(see appended tables). There are fifteen industries, employing 
bout three and one-half million ·hrorkel"'s, in which this is the 
prevailing bargaining form. In terms of s i~e of production unit , 
these industries ran5e from hosiery and. textile dyeing and finish 
ing at the one extreme to shipbuilding at the other. 
Usually, bargaining on _this basis is adapted. to these indus 
ries because of the position of the various unions in those 
fields, the geographical location of firms_, and. the kinds of pro, 
ems faced. by workers and employers in one region. NoBe of the 
o-called heavy industries are inc lud.ed in the list, with the 
ossible exception of paper and pulp and shipbuilding. Also ex-
eluded are firms engaged in finance, commerce, vlho lesale and re-
all trade. 
Bargaining on a c i ty-vride or lo ca 1-area bas is is mo re fre-
uently found in American industry than either of the other two 
argaining types discussed. For the areas or the bulk of the 
irms are confined to a given community or locality. The best 
I xamples of this are 
~ous branches of the 
J eventeen industries 
:found in the construction industry and var-
needle trades. Altogether there are about 
employing about five million illOrkers, in 
1hich bargaining is frequently on a ci ty~wide basis. The great 
ajority of these industries are in the service trades and light 
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manufacturin g fields. 
In ad dition to the lirni ted co mpetitive area so typ ical of 
these industries, another significant factor is t he large amount 
of the small employers to be found in most of them. Usually, 
the unions in t he s e trades have a grea t deal of bargaining po wer 
in dealing VJith employers , with bo t h the union's insistence on ad!-
herence to standards and the employers I Vie\vpOint in COntrolling 
co mpetiticn with l a bor costs, joint bargaining on a .- city-wide or 
local-area basis is au i te feasible and desirable. It ·is quite 
usual there fore to find. t h is system so '<'lidely adopted -in bargain 
ing systems. 
A final conclusion v1ould be that it is difficult to define 
and classify a greements into certain specific stratifica tions 
and in many cases '"here t here seems to be a borderline of doubt 
as to Wh ich class it s hall go :lnto, it \•!OUld be \•lise tr>·. use a func-
tional approach and classify the a greement in the more likely 
feasible cate gory than adhering strongly to a strict classific-
ation that might not be the general ~osition of the a greement. 
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TABLE I 
Types of Collective Bar~aining Systemsl 
Sinp:le Firm or plant · 
a. Single plant 
companies 
b. lJiul t iplant 
companies 
Pattern Following 
Areas: local, 
... regional, or 
national 
a. Craft 
b. Industry 
Multi Employer 
Areas : local, 
regional, or 
national 
a. Craft 
b . Industry 
c. Interindustry 
TABLE II 
Types of ~.C'U l ti-Employer Bargainintz2 
!Number of Employees covered by IVIul ti-Employer Agreements 
Type of Agreement 
Indus try-vlide 
Region-wide 
City or local 
area 
Total 
No. covered Percent 
(min. est.) of total 
1,241,000 26% 
1,084,000 23% 
2,376,000 51% 
4,701,000 100% 
No . covered Percent 
(max. est.) of total 
1,957,000 23% 
1,~55,000 23% 
9:,678,000 54% 
8,590,000 100% 
1 . Pierson, Frank C., 11 Industry- ~n1 ide Bargaining, 11 Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, New Yo~ k State School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations, Cornell University, ~ew York, April 
1950 , Volume 3, Number 3, p.347. 
2. Pierson, Frank C., Ibid . , p.353. 
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TABLE III 
Areas of IVhllti-Employer Bargaininp;l 
Industry 2 No . of prod. 
. workers 
% of workers3 
under union 
agreements-
1946 
% of vwrkers4 
under union 
agreement 
( Col. 3) 
covered by 
multiple 
employer 
agreement 
1 947 
Industry-Wide Barsaining 
Coal !viining : 
365,000 Bituminous 80-100 80-100 
Anthracite 76,500 80-100 80-100 
Elevator 
,Installation 
and Repair 10,200 est. 80-100 est . 80-100 est . 
Glass and 
Gla.ssware 120' 000 80-100 60-79 
Installat ion 
of automatic 
sprinklers 13,000 est . 80-100 est. 80-100 est. 
Fotte r y , 
including 
56,000 china \'/are 40-59 60-79 
6 1,352,000 e30-100 80-100 Railroads est. 
Stoves 86 ,700 20-39 20-39 est. 
Vlallpaper 6,000 80-100 80-100 est. 
Subtotal: 2,085 ,500 1,593,900- 1,240-500-
no . of 2,011,100 1,956 ,800-
employees (range) (range) 
AverageS 
no . of 
workers 
per es-
tablish-
ment 
1939 
74 
240 
17 
276 
-
114 
632 . 
93 
88 
31 
32 
TABLE III (continued) 
Ree;ion-W'ide Bar~aininr.z: 
Canning and 199,500 60-79 60-79 44 
Preserving7 Foods 
Dyeing and 
60-79 60-79 104 Finishing 7 84,500 Textiles 
Fishing 135,000 est. 20-39 40-59 est. 
-
Hosiery 132,800 40-59 20-39 171 
Intercity 
Trucking 149,500 est. 80"!"100 80-100 
-
Leather
7 Tanning 46,200 80-100 0-19 106 
Longshoring7 985,000 est. 80-100 80-100 
-
Lurnber7 650,000 40-59 20-39 31 
1.ifari t.ime 165,000 80-100 80-100 
-
Meta 1 ~Jiin ing 77,500 89-100 0-19 50 
Nonferrous 
metals and 
products 357,500 80-100 -0-19 40 
[ exc .. jel'lelry 
and silverware)7 
Paper and pulp 195,100 60-79 0-19 165 
Shipbu.ilding8 121,600 80-100 80-100 16 
Boot and 
Shoes, Cut 
Stock and 
Findings 7 19,1.1-00 40-59 20-39 36 
1:vo olen and 
~Tors ted 
Textiles 170,300 60-79 0-19 222 
Subtotal: 3,485 ,300 2,256 ,000- 1,084,000-
no. of 2, 937,500 . 1,955,300 
emplo yees (range) (range) 
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TABLE III (continued) : 
City or Local Area Ba.rp:aining 
Baking 21 6 ,000 40-59 60-79 13 
Beverages, 
non alcb.holic 32,500 20-39 20..-39 5 
Book and job 
Printing and 
60-79 60-79 Publishing 177,900 11 
Brevveries 
(malt 1 iquors) 69,600 80-100 80-100 est. 60 
Building 
service and 610 maintenance 210,000 est. 20-39 40-59 
Cleaning and 
94,600 dyeing 20-39 80-100 est. 2 
Clothing , 
men's 9 401,000 80-100 80-100 68 
Clothing , 9 women·' s 448,500 80-100 80-100 36 
Confe ctionary 
66,700 pro ducts 20-39 0-19 45 
Construction 1 ',921,000 80-100 60-79 4 
Cotton 
texti1es9 524,300 20-39 0-19 328 
Dairy products 85,000 20-39 0-19 5 
Fur and fur 
garments 25,000 est. 80-100 80-100 8 
0 Furniture/ 233,100 40-59 0-19 43 
Hotels and 310 Restaurants 918,000 est. 20-39 20-39 
Jewelry and 
silverware 51,500 40-59 20-39 45 
Ehit goods 
(exc. hosiery) 86,800 40-59 0-19 67 
I 
TABLE III (continued) 
City or Local Area Bargaining (conti nued) 
Laundries 243,000 20-39 80-100 3810 
Leather 
Lugga ge, 
handbags, etc. 
Meat pac king 
Milline ry and 
hats 
Newspa per 
print ing and 
publish ing 
13, 300 
181, 500 
36,400 
141,600 
Paper pro ducts 
(exc. wallpaper)l88,900 
Silk and r ayon 
t extiles 104,700 
Steel products 
(exc. stoves)9 742,800 
Tobacco 
products 86 ,000 
Trade9 3,584,000 est. 
True king and 
war ehousing 1,750,000 
Subtotal: 
no. of 
employees 
Grand Total 
12, 662,000 
18,232,800 
40-59 
80-100 
60-79 
80-100 
40-59 
20-39 
60-79 
60-79 
0-19 
80-100 
5,359,200-
7, 816,800 
(range) 
9,211;700-
12,765,400 
(range) 
40-59 est. 
0-19 
.l~0-59 
0-19 
0-19 
0-19 
0-19 
20-39 
40-59 
2,375,500-
4,677,800 
(range) 
4,700 ~ 000-
8,589, 900 
(range) 
25 
34 
19 
13 
51 
301 
114 
2 
1. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, M8nthly Labor 
Revie"t.,r, Collective Ba!r gaining 'l'l ith Associations and Groups of 
Employers, March 1941, Vol~me 64, Number 3, p.399. 
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2. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics , Employer and Pay-
rolls, Deta iled Report, Februa ry, 1948. 
3. United States Bureau of Lg,bor Statistics, Monthly Labor Re-
view, Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union Reco gnition, 
Volume 64, Number 5, Ivla.y 1947, 766•; 
4. "Collective Bargaining with Associa tions and Groups of Em-
ployers," op. cit., 64, Number 3, March 1947, 399. 
5. Comput e d from United States Census Reports on number of es-
tablishments and employees in 1939. 
6 . Ivlajor is =: ues are n s. gotiated on an industry- wide basis, but 
a greements cont inue to be si sne d. by each railroad system. 
7. 'rhere i. s also some bargainin €5 on a city, county, and/or 
metropolitan basis. 
8 . On wes t coast covered by master agre '3ment negotiated on a 
r egional basis. On east coast, agreements are primarily Nith 
individual co mpanies. During 1t!orld 1tfar II tripartite bas is. 
9. Also ba r gaining on a re g i onal and/or industry-wide basi s. 
10. Excludes active proprietors . 
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CHAPI'ER 3 
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF !vlULT I-EIVIPLOYER BARGATIJING 
This chapter wil l (1) trace the growth of multi-employer 
bargaining in the United States in selected manufacturing, ex-
tractive, and service industries, and ( 2) sho\v through the 
course of history of multi-employer barga ining that order and 
stabilization have been the result of this type of bargaining 
rather than the chaotic and disturbing conditions which preceded 1 
In sele cting the specific industries for study, two criteri 
were stressed: (1) a sufficiently long pe riod of experience 
with standard industry rates under national or ~egional bargain-
ing, and (2) a 'ltiide variation in the economic circumstances and 
experience of the selected industries so that instructive corn-
parisons could be made. 
In discussing these re presentative industries the method to 
be used is, a definition of the industry, a brief analysis of 
the economi c chara cteristics and finally a historical review of 
the colle ctive bargaining relations in the industry along v1 ith 
t he reasons for its success. 
The division of t he industries by t ypes, such as manufac-
turing , extractive and service is strictly arbitrary and is used 
primarily for ease of analysis and for purposes of continuity. 
I 
The industries chosen a s representative of the manufactur-
1. No doubt there are other economic factors contributing to the 
peaceful and orderly conditions in these industries, but for 
I======IIF==i'=u,~n<e~p·Urpose or unls paper, tne conur1ouu10n maae oy mu.L ul-
emplo yer bargaining will be emphasized. 
ing category a re the glass bottle, the stove, and the hosiery in 
ld.ustries. The glas s i ndu s try lends itself well to historical 
analysis a s re presentative of multi-employer bargaining. The 
glass industry is co mposed of three ma jor subdivisions : flat 
glass (window, plate, and. buildin g ), containers (bottles rand 
jars), and pre ssed and blow.a. v1are, so me times referred to as flin1 
1 glass. 
The phase of the glass industry to be discussed is tha t of 
bottle glass. Since the background and me thods of collective 
bargaining in the glas s industry are qu ite similar for bottle 
g:r as s and flint glass, a discussion of the bottle glass industry 
will cover the problem adequately. 
Heasured by capital invested , value of output and number em-
ployed , the glass industry is of secondary importance in the 
national economy. In the s phere of colle ctive bargaining , how-
ever, its record of more than fifty years of successful union-
management relations in so me of its branches, despite tremendous 
obstacles introduced by the mechanical revolution, is almost u-
nique in t he mass production field. 
The re have been a number of factors ·whi ch have had direct 
~nd importru1t bearing u pon colle ctive bargaining relations in the 
glass bottle industry . 2 One of the most important effects on re-
1. Lester, Richard. A., and Robie, Ed11ard A., \'lages Under Nationa, 
and R9gional Collective Bargaining . Princeton, N.J., Prince- ~ 
ton University Press, 1946, p . lO . ' 
2. Daugherty, Carrol R., 11 Industrial Disputes in Glass Bottle In-
dustry," Journal of Political Economy, Dec. 1928, p . 705. 
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lations bet-vreen employers and employees in the. glass bottle in-
dustry is the introduction of labor-saving ma chinery. Before 
the introduction of machinery , bottle-making was a ~ascinating 
trade requiring a high degree of skill and an unusual amount of 
technical knowledge. 'r-he nature of the work was responsible for 
the deve lopment of the hand glassblov1er as a trade-union man, 
conservative , highly paid, and jealous of his rights. Before 
1900, glas s making was still practically in the handicraft stage 
although molding machines for pressed ware were invented as ea~l~ 
as 1827. The skilled a r tisan was the backbone of the industry, 
while boys performed the bulk of the unskilled work. The avera p::l 
plant i'las small; and investment was so slight that there '\'las con 
siderable mobility of labor. The consequences of technological 
advances were enormous. The increase in pro ductivity per man 
hour made possible by the machine ranged from 642 to about 4010 
per cent in bottles and jars. The glass bottle industry has wit 
nessed the struggle of machine v-1i th machine as 11ell as the con-
f liqt beti-reen hand-blower and displacing machine . The various 
kinds of devices have differed in the amount of hand labor dis-
placed and in degree of skill required in employees who operate 
the new machines . The early semi-automatic machines, first 
brought out in 1 898, r e qu ired skilled operators, v1hile the fam-
ous O"t1ens Automatic Machine, a decade later, demanded no s pecial 
skill. 'rhe latter has been the chief disrupting factor for the 
union ; many employers using the Owens ma chine have ceased their 
relations with the employees' organization. However, the intro-
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1uene d t he effect of t he Owens. Many employers lac king the cap i-
I f al necessary 
r eed and flo \·l 
to install the expens ive automatic, ha ve used the 
devices, and with t hese manufacturers the union 
~s gradually succeeded in establishing dealings. 
At present there are only five or six factories ope r a ting 
~holly by hand methods and making bottles of special types. The 
~nion has never fou ght the introduction of mach inery; its lead-
lel"S have -vv isely decided rather to attempt the unionization of 
the new factories by peaceful me t hods an d to secu r e the employ-
ment of displaced blov1ers on the nevl machines. 
Since the forma tion of the present associations in 1890 
there have been no strikes or real lockouts betv1een union employ-
~es or employers. 1 This in itse lf is a criterion of the success 
p f the system. There have been stri kes instituted by the union 
in non-union fi e l ds and carried on with great vi gor in order to 
stamp out tha t menace to their existence, but between the union-
ized empl oyers and employees there have been no organized stop-
pages. Upon several occasions the conferences have resulted in 
deadlocks, neithe r s ide being vTil J.ing to conced.e the demands of 
the other. Thus in 1 891 the employe rs left without s i gn lng 
the a gree ment 1·1hile in 1905 and 1909 t hey s igned under protest 
and with the vmrning that the y could. not promise to keep all 
members in line. But uno.e r such cono ltions it has been the cus-
tom of the conferences to adjourn and for most of t he employers 
to operate under the pr ices and rules of the preceding year, in 
1. Daugherty, Carrol R., op. cit., p. 704. 
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I 
-~the jope of reaching an a greement t he next year. In 1905 and 
1
1909 there ~q ere s hort su spensions of work by the employers fol-
lo'\~ring ina.bili ty to a gree at the final conference; but after 
s everal wee Jr,_s of inactivity one employer broke ran ks and caused 
the others to seek another special conference at -v.,rhich an a gree-
ment vms finally reached. The s ystem of collective bargaining 
adopted in 1890 called for an annual conference between repre-
sentatives of each as socia tion. On the union's side it is the 
executive board which meets the employers; this body is composed 
of the president, vlce-president, and secretary of the union, to 
gather with six other men elected a t the annual convention of th 
employees. The employers' vvage committee is also an executive 
board, of t1velve members, appointed by the c ha irman of the manu-
facturers 1 association according to the kind of v1or k done in 
their factories so that each bran ch of the trade may be repre-. 
sen ted. 
'methods. 
casting its vote frequently after a caucus. An elaborate list o 
piece-work wa ge rates is decided u pon and working rules are fixe , 
r egard ing hours, discharge, apprentices, and other conditions. 
These then are the essential features of the system of col-
lective bargaining: (1) annual preliminary and final conference 
between powerful vJage cornmi ttees with a high degree of central-
ized authority for fixing wage rates and working rules; (2) the 
decision of interpretive questions arising under the agreement 
by the president of the union; (3) a greements, separate for the 
seven divisions of the industr • 
The reason for peaceful labor relations in the glass bottle 
industry is due mostly to the conference type of bargaining . It 
has pro duced greater stabf'lity into the industry b y providing a 
ldefini te basis for management and men to vwr k on throu ghout the 
year. Both s ides seem to have foun d that this system whereby rel 
.atively constant costs and p rices are af f orded, in the multi-em-
lployer type of bargaining is one which advances their o1m selfis' 
interests better than any other. Vfuenever an industry voluntari 
ly sets up an arbitraticn eystem with t he multi:"-ernployer type of 
argaining its success largely depends upon the collective bar-
gaining spirit itself and thi s is especia lly true for the glass 
bottle industry VJhe r e no outsicers at all are connec t e c with the 
s ystem and \'there decisions may be '. reviewed in a collective-bar-
gaining conference. 
In the manufacturing category , the stove industry is also a 
goo d example of successful labor r e lations based on a long his-
tory of multi - employer bargaining. The stove industry is hard t 
delineate because of the wide variety of h eating and cookine; ap-
pliances no\'1 pro duced . 1 For the purpo ses o f this study, the in-
dustry i s assume d to include p ro ducts grouped b y the Bureau of 
the Census under the ,he ading of "stoves , ranges, ,_,;ater heaters, 
nd hot - air furnaces (except electric) 11 , plus electric ranges. 
The difficulty of definin g the industry is the result of 
1
.evelopmen ts tha t have comple tely changed the industry's char-
acter, grea tly reducing the number of molde rs and core ma kers 
it employs. Before lflorlo, Vlar I most stoves 'tlere designed to 
and v1e r e ely of heav' cast iron 
e,op. ci 
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Soon t hereafter , sheet me tal fabrication became important, and 
gas· and oil be gan cornnetinn: with coal and wood. 
..._,. ... ..._ .. Iviore recently 
electricity has be co me an important competitor. 
Certain economic characteristics are inherent in the stove 
ind.ustry.l The highly competitive nature of the industry vvhich 
was one of the chief motivating forces for national collective 
~argaining in 1891 , still persists, althou gh to a somewhat less 
degree than formerly. In spite of recent mergers and expansions, 
the industry still consists of a large number of small firms. 
In 1921 it included over five hundred establishments, \vi th ap-
proximately 35 , 000 employees. In 1939 'IJ>Then t he re were about 
four hundred establishments with 50,000 emplo yees, the l argest 
four companies accounted for only about sixteen per cent of the 
industry's total output. 
The difficulty of maintaining uniform wage rates in the in-
~ustry is enhanced by marked product diversification. Although 
some castings are rela tively standard for special types of 
stoves, such as burners for gas range s and grates for coal and 
~ood stoves , the majority of cast pi e ces are at least pe culiar 
to one specific type of stove, and often they are pe culiar to 
the particular brand of stove made by one company. A few co m-
panies specialize in one kind of stove, such as gas or electric , 
but the majority make several types. 
The industry is characterized by a high rate of labor cost 
to total manufacturing cost. In 1900 l abor cost for the industrJ 
1. Lester and Robie, on. cit., p.33. 
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as a whole v.ras estimated at from forty to fifty per cent of man-
ufacturing cost; early in 1 946 estimates varied !rom twenty-five 
to forty-five per cent, depending on the efficiency of the plant 
the t ypes of stoves produced, and the p ro gress achieved in recon 
version. Piece rates generally prevail for journeymen, vlhile 
the semi-s killed and uns killed Harkers are usually paid by time 
rates, often combined with a n incentive plan. 
Tecm1ological changes have caused a decline in the number o 1 
journeymen foun dry vlorkers employed in the industry, thereby re-
ducing the influence of the Conference Agreement. Output per 
man hour was considerably i-ncreased by the molding ma chine, the 
use of vlhich vms s preading widely by 1915, and by the continuous 
molding process, which was introdu ced a round 1929. Furthermore, 
sheet metal has tended to displace castings to such an extent 
that a number of stove firms have g iven up their foundries or 
have been forceo_ to do jobbing v-rork in fields related to stove 
production. 'rhe average modern gas range includes only about 
tv-renty-five pounds of casting, out of a total weight of some 
three hundred pounds, and this ratio holds true for most types 
except coal and 1r1ood stoves. 'rhe result has been a much lo v1er 
percentage of s killed workers in the industry than for "'lerly; in 
1946 only about 15,000 of the 50,000 wage ear-Ders '\vere s killed 
craftsmen, most of them foundry journeymen and maintenance men. 
'rhirty years earlier the industry employed more than double that 
number of skilled v1orkers. 
A review of the bac kground of collective barsainins in the 
stove industry showed that three turbulent, discontented decades 
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preceded peaceful colle c t ive bargaining.1 In this highly charge ~ 
atmos phere almost any issue could hav e been a cause for 1'1ar , but 
v;a ges, appr ent ice ratios and the use of 11bu c ks 11 or 11ber ks h ires 11 
(helpers ) ·were the most troublesome. 
'tlages v a rie·d be t 1r1een areas and plants, and the higher pa yinffi 
employers vT? re constan tly forced t9 press for r eduction. · Eore- , 
over, d iffe rent p iece rates often pr evailed for the same work in 
the same shop , and d isputes over pay for ''du ll 11 (col d ) and 11 d i r t :'i " 
. " ,] 
(impure) iron 'l'lere frequent. 3:mplo ye rs 1 p l ans to engage an un-
limited number o f apprentices vrere fou~ht b y the union through 
fear that this meant a d ilution of t he trade b y cheap boy l a bor 
'land eventually lo1t1 '~Ha ges and unemployment. By do i n e; part o f the 
molders' vmrk the berkshires could l earn t h :; trade, and t hreat-
ened the jourfle ymen 's posit i on du ring labor cont rove rsie s. Oth-
er g r:ievances we re absen ce of standard starting and qu itt ing 
!times a n d constant pre s sure on p iece rates, the earnings of the 
1!nost e f fi cient being , u sed as an e xa mple of wha t t he a.v e ra rze vrorl-
er could earn. From t he day of its forma tion in 1859 , the ~Na tior: ll 
ILJn i on of Iron Molders wa ged a constant fi ght against these con-
di tion s. Finally the employers launched the Stove Founders ' 
11-~a tiona l Defense As s ociation "to comb ine its members for res is-
tance a gainst the unjus t demands · of \vorkmen ." Both sides v1ere . I 
10 v1 organ ized nationally. After a long and bitter strike in 
February of 1 887 qver '~.<ra ge clispute s both sides de cided unoffici- J, 
1. Taft, Phillip, 11 Col1e ctive Bargaining Before the New Deal." 
(In T'\·Jentieth Century F'und , How Collective Bar P:aininP: \."l'or ks , 
New Yor k , 1942, p . 890.) 
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allyto a chieve peaceful conditions. How to bring about general 
ad.option o f peaceful methods 1·1as explored at frequent conference • 
The first step to-vmrds a national agreement was openly tak-
en in 1890 by the l'Jiolders 1 Union convention, vvhich instructed 
its "incoming executive board. to communicate \vith the represen-
tatives of t he Stove Manufacturers 1 Associa tion with a vievJ to 
holding a conference with them to d iscuss the points of differ-
ence • " This communication vta s fa'vo ra b ly received by the As so c i-
ation and in 1891 the first Conference Agreement was set up, 
containing a statement o f pea ceful intentions. This set up a 
bipartisan six-man conference co mm ittee 1-'Ihose majority vote 
could make final decisions on a ll disputed questions.l Strikes 
or lockouts were outlawed "pending adjudication." A clause 
added in 1903 provided tha t p iece rates for new work s hould be 
based on the rates pa id for competitive stoves made in the same 
geographical district. It was not until 1914 that a list of 
piece rates was a greed upon for a ll Associa tion shops. However , 
I such a list h~ s never been included in the Conference Agreement. 
I The joint conference a greement, which vms enlarged to twelve 
members in 1910, has always functioned vli th f u ll authority to 
make final and binding s e ttlement on a ll matters , includ.ing 
wages. In actual practice the bul k of the n e go tiating is usuall 
done by a sub-committee compose d of three representatives of the 
Associa tion and a like number from the Union. 
Althou gh there have been some d ifficult problems, there 
1. Lester and Robie, op. cit., p.37. 
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has never been an a uthorized strike or loc kout in shops covered 
by the Agreement. Occa siona l \vildcat sto ppages are effectively 
handled by the Union's officers. r he Association, too, keeps 
its members in line, and in at least one case has refused to 
help a member during a strike in V!hich the position of the com-
pany vms considered ind.efens ible. An unusual amount of patience 
has been shown by both sides ; problems like the introduction of 
the mol d ing machine, the regulation of apprenticeship, and the 
granting of paid vacations have been considered and negotiated 
for years before a settlement \'las finally reached. 
Thus it appears that the success of the trade a greement in 
the stove industry can be explained by the prevailing market 
situation. An overdevelo pment of facilities for production in 
a static or declining mar ket made necessary the equalizing of 
costs if the manufacturers were to maintain profitable prices 
and share in the total business. The joint conference, and 
multi-employer bargaining a greement provided for performing this 
function so well that the members 'of the Association preferred 
the security of a Union enforced equa lity to the competitive 
dangers of non-union operation. 
The final representative industry in the manufacturing 
cate gory is the full-fashioned hosiePy industry which is highly 
competitive and yet has conducted multi-employer bargaining on a 
large scale for a consid.erable length of time. 1 The full-fash-
ioned hosiery industry includes about 55 ,000 workers engaged al-
11. Lester and Robie, op. cit., p . 43. 
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I 
most exclusively in the production of women's stockings, and 
unlike the seamless variety, the full-fashioned hosiery is knit-
ted flat and is shaped by decreasing the number of stitches dur-
ing the knitting pro cess. It is then seamed up the back to form 
a stocking that closely fits the leg. 
The economic characteristics of the full-fashioned hosiery 
industry shov-r it to be a highly competitive industry in which 
close to four hundred firms operate approximately four hundred 
and twenty-five mills and s mg, ll firms predominate . 1 Two thirds cf 
all mills have less than t1,,1enty-five knitting machines, and in 
the Philadelphia area alone there are perhaps fifty establish-
ments \"lith four or five knitting machines and fifteen or twenty 
employees. The t".·lo larges t firms in the industry account for no 
more than twelve per cPnt of the industry. 
The demand for 11stabilization through unionization" arises 
~ot only from the large number of small firms producing full-
fashioned hosiery but also because t he industry has been charac-
terized by overcapacity, price cutting , h i gh mortality of com-
panies , d.eclining employment , highly specialized equipment, and 
labor losses averaging from forty to fifty pe r cent of total 
manufacturing costs. 
Overcapacity developed in the industry for a number of reas 
ons. Consumer de mand fell off sharply after 1929. It is rela-
tively easy to enter the industry , full-fashioned knitting ma-
chinery can only be used for ma king hosiery, and high-paid hosie y 
1. Lester and Robie, op. cit., p.44. 
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workers nave s kills that are peculiar to the industry. Union 
knitters, vlhose full-time earnings averaged about $3,500 in 1929, 
tended to set up their ovm s mall shops rather than seek employ-
ment in a new occupation. 
Knittin g mach ines are complicated equipment, requirin g high-
ly s killed workmen to operate. A survey of the industry by the 
Bureau of Labor Sta tistics in 1 938 cla ssifie d sixty-four per cent 
of the e mployees as s killed, t vu:mty-three per cent semi-skilled, 
and thirteen per cent unskilled. Three fifths of the industry's 
v1ork force is women, and normally about eighty-five per cent of 
the p roduction employees are i'l'Orking on piece rates. 
A brief review of collective barga ining shows t hat there 
jwas a period of instability and. confusion in union-management 
rela tions until the ince ption of multi-employer bargaining in 
~ 929. 1 I'he union manufacturers organized n :ot- ti onally in 1929 as 
the Full-Fashioned Hosiery ~Jlanufacturers o f America, Inc. The 
major purpose of this association is to deal colle ctively with 
the American Federation of Hosiery \1/'orkers in establishing a 
wa ge policy for the industry. Such joint dealings were preceded 
by tivent y years of hit-or-miss relations, at first vlithout a gree-
rnents, and then through individual plant agreements. The former 
amounte d to nothing more than guerilla warfare on the industrial 
front; the plant a greements, although ma rking the end of guerilla 
f'larf:are, continued unstabl e labor relations because they _varied 
!widely in rates and conditions of -vmr k . On an upswing , the local 
~. Taylor, "Hosiery." (In T'\'Tentiet~ Century Fund, How Collec-
tive Bargainln.s ~,"lorks, New York, 1942, p .454.) 
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unions pressed constantly for unifo r mity at the highest prevail-
ing l evel; on a dovmswing, employers demanded uniformity at the 
lowest prevailing l evel. In 1929, both parties foresaw an im-
pending deflation and favore d a definite and tmiform v.rage policy 
i n place of the uncertainty of setting 1-1ages b y continuous s kir-
mishes. Acceptance of multi-employer bargaining was based upon 
employer recognition of the union as a permanent and essential 
part of the industry.' 
The first National Labor Agreement was negotiated by the 
Hosiery Workers and the ne1-rly formed Full-Fashioned Hosiery I'-1an-
ufacturers of America, Inc. in 1929 and covered knitters and 
their helpers. It stated that "in ord.er to ma i n tain fair stan-
dards in the Lndust ry, the conditions of v.Jork and the cost of 
labor shall be· equalized" through a "schedule of detailed rates 
and conditions" that applied "uniformly to all factories" affil-
iated 1-'Ti th the manufacturers 1 association and all covered locals 
of the union.l Provision 11as made for an impartial chairman to 
settle disputes under the agreement and for the union shop,. 
Although covering but twenty to thirty-five per cent of the 
industry 's equipment since 1929, National Labor Agreements have 
tended to determine. the pattern of changes in 1-rages and v10r king 
conditions throughout the industry. The non-association union 
employe rs in t he North, who negotiate separately, sie;n agreement~ 
'\'lhich are either identical with the National Agreement or, like 
the agreement v1 i th the Keystone Hanufacturers 1 Association, con-
tain p ractically the same l a bor standards. 
1 .• Lester and Robie, op. cit., . p.47. 
In 1936, negotiations betvJeen the Fu ll-Fashioned Hosiery 
Manufa cturers of America, Inc. and the Hosiery \'/orkers broke 
dovm and all a greements either expired or 'tlere cancelled by the 
union. DtJ.ring the period of no vlri tten agreements fro m October 
23, 1936 to Jun.e 15, 1937, the parties carried on as though the 
old agreements 1-Tere still in effect . The common lal'l that had 
been built up through collective bargaining still served to solvE 
most of the labor problems that a rose. No strikes have been 
sanctioned by the union against members of the manufacturers' 
!a ssociation since the first National Labor Agreement \'las signed . 
As an example of industrial peace , the relationshin since 
11929 between the Full-Fashioned Hosiery Manufacturers and the 
Hosiery 'tlorkers is an'enviable record. Th.:tiring this entire per-
iod there have been no authorized strikes in association mills 
land V.Jild.ca t stoppage s have been reduced to insignificance. 'traen 
compare d with the recent turbulent labor relations in many other 
!industries and. with the 
~ustry before 1929, the 
~nvites investigation. 
fr e quency of strikes in the hosiery in-
experience in hosiery since that date 
One goo Cl reason for the ind.ustrial peace is t hat one of the 
goals of the parties in underta king multi-employer bargaining 
/3.nd adopting the Impartial Chairmanship in 1 929 -vms the attain-
~ont of stability of prices , profits , and wages .l Both union 
and mana gement believed from the beginning o f the new collective 
pargaining system in 1929 that stability depends among other 
,.._. Kennedy , Thomas, Effect ive Labor Arbitration. 
PeP~sylvania Press, Penn., 1948. p.211~ 
University of 
50 
thin gs on uniform or nearly uniform labor costs throughout the 
major portion of the industry and that such a condition in tur:tJ. 
depends on the ext"msion of collect ive bargaining. vii th unioni-
zation firmly a c cepted_ by management and uniform or nearly uni-
form l a bor costs accepted_ under an industry-v.1ide contract, along 
with the help of t he Impartial Chairmanship , aiding in the en-
forcement of the contract rates, stability and industrial peace 
were fairly well achieved. 
II 
In the extractive cate go r y of industries , bituminous coal, 
·v;ith its detailed history of colle ctive bargaining offers a 
fruitful fie1d for research. 1 Bituminous coal is pre-eminently 
the fuel of commerce and industvy ln all parts of the country. 
Ln 1929 about seventy-five per cent of the domestic consumption 
(exports are about three pe r cent of productiom) vJent to rail-
roads, factories, coke ovens, electric utili ties and stee l v.rorks 
including blast furnaces and rolling mills. Domesti c and other 
uses and the bunker trade accounted for the remaining twenty-
five per cent . In 1 9Li-O it furnished forty-four and. two tenths 
per cent of the annual supply of energy from mineral fuels and 
1rJater po1,1e r in the Unit ed Sta tes and contributed approxi mate ly 
fifteen per cent of the total value of all mineral products and 
tvlenty-eight per cent of t he va lue o f all non-metallic fuels.2 
1. Fisher, ~valdo E ., 11 Bituminous Coal. 11 (In ·rwentieth Century 
Fund, How Colle ctive Bargainin r.;: 1tTor ks , Ne,.'l York, 1942, p .230.) 
2. u.s., N. W. L . B., Division of Vlao:e Stabilization , "Report on 
·wages and Related Problems · in the Bituminous Coal Industry," 
Washington, D.C., April 28, 1943, p.l. 
51 
The economics of the bituminous coal industry "dell exempli-
fies the conditions under 1·1hich union and management ..,vel come 
stabilization; since t he re are a large number of firms in the in-
dustry , labor costs represent a great part of total costs of 
!Production and the industry is no longer expanding rapidly in 
terms of sales.l Bituminous coal is mined commercially in over 
~ ,000 mines in thir ty-odd states. The thickness, the depth, t he 
slant, and the character of the coal veins varie s considerably 
!between mines and even 'Hi thin th2 same mine , so that it is not 
feasibl g to try to undercut some soft-coal veins by ma chinery . 
In addition, mines vary in the distance betHeen t he mine · and. the 
· consumers. Suc h non-uniformity betv;een mines has given rise to 
!thin-vein, machine and ~reight d ifferentials in wages , as a meane 
pf offsettine; the natural handicaps of certain mines . 
There are 9_bout 4;000 operating companies in the soft-co.al · 
industry. The largest p roducer a ccounts for only about three 
IPer cent of the total output, and t he l argest t1.vo hundred firms 
control no more than about one third of t he total production. 
~ orne of the largest producers of bituminous coal are the so-called. 
~'captive mines, 11 vihich are O'imed by coal consumers such as steel 
nd railroad co mpanie s and wh ich account for about one fifth of 
11 soft-coal production. Bet1'v'een 400,000 and. 500,000 vvorkers 
re employed in and around the soft-coal mines. T'tro thirds of 
these workers are or, piece rates, for those 1r1ho actuall y do t he 
ining are paid b y the tons of coal they mine, 'I..Yhile the others 
• Lester, Richard A., Economi cs of Labor. Ma cmillan Co., Nevr 
York, 1941. pp.793-7 99 ~ 
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who -vwrk in and around t he mine are paid by the day. Coal miner 
a re Used to HOrkin g at their Own pace Vl ith li t tle SUpervision. 
The price structure in bituminous coal has been extraordi- .. · 
narily fle xible. Not only have pr ices fluctuate d i:videly, but on 
a certain day the pr ice a t the mine for a g iven -grade o f coa l 
frequently has varied bet-v1een custome rs and markets . Such vari-
a t ions result from allov1ance for d i ffe rences in the frei ght rater 
to variou s markets, from partial absorption of frei gh t r ate s by 
mine operators, fromill f f erences in the competitive s ituation in 
various market areas, etc. In soft-coal mining , wages or labor 
I 1avera ge about two t h irds o f all costs, while in other t ypes of 
mining , wages generally con stitute a round one fifth of total 
costs. With wa ges such a large proportion of total expenses, a 
c onsiderabl e reduction ih .costs fu coal mining is bound to in-
valve a cut in -v.;ages. Certain other costs can, of co u rs·e , be 
reduced, as for instance, interest and oth~fixed costs, royal-
ties, and charges for depletion, v,rhich to gether may account for 
as mu ch as one sixth o f a ll coal-m ining costs. It has been a 
co mmon occurrence du ring the past two decades for soft-coal corn-
panies to go through bankruptcy, ;,1ith the mines cont inuing to 
operate under new manage ment and under greatly reduce d .. capital 
charges. 
The deman d for bituminous coal is large ly a demand for pow-
er rather t han for fuel , and the ch ief consumers are the nation' 
great inciustries . 11anufacturin .~ plants account for over a third j 
railroads for over a fifth, and~ e~sctric utilities for over a ~~ 
tenth , of the total c on sumpt ion of bituminous coal. Consequentl , 
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the demand is i n large measure determined by the volume of indus-
trial production and varies vJith the business cycle. 
As far as supply, bituminous coal cannot be kept for any 
length of ·time after it i s mined, since it disintegrates rapidly. 
For this and other reasons, soft coal is gene rally sold before 
it is mined , which means that pot <? ntial, not a ctual, output is 
peddled in the market . Th - practice of selling unmined coal has 
tended to depress prices because the indu s try , especially since 
t he first Vlorld 1t!ar, has suffered from ex:cess capacity. Various 
factors have been responsible for such excessive capacity in the 
industry. Oapi tal investment in mining property and equipment 
(excavation of the shaft, hoisting ma ch inery, ventilating sys-
tems, etc.) represents a permanent investment of a highly speci-
alized. character. Neither the eflUipment nor t he property can be 
use d for other kind.s of business. And mines once opened may de-
teriorate rapidly if unused for long per iods _of time. Meanwhile 
taxes, insurance, and interest on t he investment continue. To 
sum up, the economic characteristics of t he bituminous coal in-
dustry have been recurring overdevelopment, intense competition, 
price instability and d isturbed industrial relations. 
It is difficult to be brief i n any review of collective bar 
gaining in the bituminous coal indastry, since it had its incep-
tion as far bac k as halfway through the nineteenth century, ·when 
soft-coal v.ro rkers be gan to orga nize.l Labor organization, how-
ever, did not rna terially influence the status of the mine vJOrker 
1. U .S.~ U. V'T.L.B., Division of ltlage Stabilization, op • . cit., 
p.l T~ 
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until successive pri ce wars, wage reductions, and irregular oper 
ation, the result s of overdevelopment which characterized much 
of t he history of t h is industry , led operators and miners to es-
tablish inte rstate collective bargaining arrangements that placec 
co mpetition be tween fields on a higher wage l evel. Int ersta te 
agreements, first negotiated i n 1886 by t he more important pro-
ducing fields, ~·re re renev~ed annually, but each rene vJal witnessed 
the v/ithdravtal of groups of ope rators until the movement collap-
sed in 1889 . 
The United Hine •1vor ke rs of America, a loose federation of 
the two rival national unions, was established in 1890 and soon 
became the do minant labor organ ization 'o f t he bituminous and 
later the anthracite industry. Betv1een 1890 and 1898 the oper-
a tors 1 reve rs ion to drastic price and vmge re ductions , and_ the 
p r evailing unemployment gave rise to a succession of strikes 
which in turn l ed to t he joint conference of 1898 and eventually 
to an interstate agreement that established a basic eight-hour 
day, a wage scale for sel ected occupations paid on a time ·basis, 
and standard pie ce rates for "basing " points in "the Central Com 
peti tive Field, 11 an area comprising the coalfields of Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, and Weste rn Pennsylvania. The a greement was re-
nevred with minor changes and subsequent contracts vJere negotiatecj 
at irregular intervals until 1927, although in certain ·yearswheJ 
the conferences dead.loc ked , s eparate a greements 1r1ere arrived at 
within t he i ndividual districts. 
At the turn of the century, unions i"lere also active in the 
coal fi elds of Northe rn and Central Pennsylvania, Michigan, and 
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Iowa, and a fe w years later became an important factor in the 
mining states of the Northwest, · the South1t1est, and of ¥-festern 
Kentucky. Despite heroic efforts, the United Iliine \'forkers could 
not secure a permanent foothold in most of the rapidly gro'tt;ing 
southeastern coal fields and in certain sections of Pennsylvania. 
!After 1923 the tinion lost ground steadily. The encroachment of 
lthe non-union southern areas upon the natural mar kets of the or-
gan ized northern fields, the unwillingness of the miners' union 
to accept 'V'Ta ge reductions in the organized areas, the decline 
in the demand for coal occasioned by better coal utilization and 
the competition of other fuels, t he depression v1hich be gan in 
1929, and the unemployment caused by this combLDation of circum-
stances reduced the proporti~n of the coal mined under union 
contract fro m over seventy per cent to approximately twenty per 
cent in 1932 . 
This brief review of employer-employee rela tions in the bi-
tuminous coal industry prior to the Ne\'1 Deal legislation dis closEs 
that long experience vli th individual bargaining convinced many 
operators and miners that some form of collective bargaining 'ttras 
~ecessary to bring order into the industry; that ruthless price 
wars and \·la9:e slashing "afforded no relief to capi tal 11 but "caused 
. ~ ~ 
the capital invested in mines to yield little or no profitable 
returns"; and t hat a higher price for labor "would prove bene-
ficial to the ope rators11 and remove the "general discontent of 
the miners. "1 
1. Fisher, vvaldo E ., Collective Bargaining in the Bituminous 
Coal Industrv, Unive r sity of Pennsyl~ania Press, Penn., 1948. 
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Stabilization of the industry was attempted by the Central 
Competitive Field joint conference.1 The tonnage represented in 
those conferences varied from forty to seventy per cent Of the tot-
al national production of bituminous coal. Since the 1933-1934 
period the United l'Jiine ~.Vorkers of America (m .. 'lWA) had greatly ex-
tended its organization into coal fields previously unorganized. 
As a result during the 1930's contract negotiations between the 
union and operators have become largely all-inclusive and only 
an insignificant percentage of the approximately four hundred 
and fifty thousand bituminous mine rs and sixteen thousand oper-
ators are not represented in them. The negotiations between the 
representatives of the coal-operators 1 as so cia tions and the UiviW 
in the Central Competitive Field have a special sLgnificance. 
The wa ge rates and other basic contractual conditions a greed u-
pon in them determine the level of wage rates and other basic 
terms of e mployment in all of the bituminous coal-producing fielcs 
in the nation.- . 
. In organizational structure the miners and operators paral-
lel each other. The former are organized into local unions that~ 
. I 
as a rule, embrace a single mine. These locals, in turn, _, are . or~ -
ganized into twenty-nine districts. Thus the unit of action 
and control is one provid.ing for the greatest possible de gree of 
participation by the miners. Upon this base the pyramid of 
union organization is erected. Each district is represented on 
the Executive Board of the International Union of the United 
1. Golden, Clinton s., and Ruttenberg, Harold J., The Dynamics o ' 
Industrial Democracy. Har per & Brothers, N.Y., 1942. p.296. 
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Mine Workers of America. Biennially the Interna tional Union 
holds a convention vJh ich is attended by more than 1,500 delegateE 
fro m the affiliated local unions. One o f the most important i-
terns of business is the selection of the Policy Committee; it 
meets prior to the expiration of the UivTirf' s wage contracts in the 
industry for the purpose of formulating both policies and pro-
posals for contract revisions. This committee is made up of some 
hundred and fifty local and_ international union re presen tatives, 
an d its functions are to serve as t h e union 1 s general v1a ge ne-
gotiating agency. 
On the operators' side the basic unit of organization is a 
district association co mprising the operators within a g iven 
geographical area. The Centra 1 Competi ti v .e Field is divided intc 
Northern and Southern groups. In the Northern group there are 
more t han a score of associations of opera tors, \vh ile the South-
ern group covers more than a dozen s u ch associations. Taken to-
gether, there is for all practical purposes comple te organizatior, 
on a vlOrkable democratic basis, of all coal ope rators on the one 
hand and all coal min3rs on the other. Every two years they ne-
gotiate an industry-vTide collective-barga ining contract. 
The reasons for the success of industry-wide bargaining in 
bituminous mining was quite evident. The operators and miners, 
amon g other t hings had l e arned to work together. They had co-
operated in securing t he pa ssage of federal legis.lation designed 
to stabilize the ir industry, and had presented similar vienrs to 
Congressional committees on national problems of concern to bi- j 
tuminous mining. They had e stablished joint commissions to stud~ 
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the effects of transportation costs and o f tec0nolo gical changes 
in the produc tion of soft coal, and to study other matters of 
mutual interest. Even more important is the way ind.ustry-lvide 
bargaining had served to stabilize the soft-coal industry, which 
had suffered disastrously from pr ice-cutting and unprofitable op-
erations, due to unfair wage differentials enjoyed by coal op-
erators in certain districts. Many problems remain unsolved, sue ~ 
as soft-coal competition with other fuels, and the levels of out I 
put and employment in rela tion to the rate of nati.onal business 
and industrial activity. Along vlith these problems, the domi-
;nant and militant leadership of John L. Lewis, the head of the 
UI'-f!tlA , strongly influences policy and action, vlhich in some in-
stances creates new problems . 
It can be ar gued effectively that the bituminous coal in-
dustry is a poor example to use as a model for order and st~-
bilization, but it can also be pointed out that the conference 
~argaining use d by the ill~1A and the management has made a genu-
ine contribution to stabilization. It might be we ll to remember 
chat these problems are beyond the scope of effective action by 
a single industry and may r e quire national action of management , 
organized labor and government .l 
III 
·rhe last to be d i s cussed is the service category of which 
the railroad industry is considered. to be representative. The 
railroad industry, like bituminous coal, has a long history of 
1. Golden and. Rutt enberg, ou. cit., p.299 • • 
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collective bargaining. It is difficult to delineate t he industrJ 
but for t he purposes of this paper , it can be said that the rail- , 
road indus try covers those engaged in rail transportation. This 
seems rather vague but it must be remembered that there are t l"l en-, 
ty-one "standard 11 railroad unions dealing vl ith management.l The::e 
include the four brotherhoods (locomotive engineers, conductors, 
firemen, t rainmen ), the seven ''shop-craft" unions, and the ten 
"miscellaneous" craft unions. The sho p-craft unions are in the 
RailvJay :i:mployees' Department of the AFL and have ahvays acted 
as a unit in collective bargaining, as if they 1A~ere one union. 
Their membe rs "''o r lr in railroad construction an d repair shops, 
and most of them, such as the Ma chinists, Electrical i•Torkers, 
and Sheet Metal 1rTorkers, have the bulk of th3ir membership in 
other industries. The miscellaneous crafts include the unions 
of such workers as the tele graphers, sisnalmen, clerks, marine 
craftsmen '.·Tho work on railroad wharves or boats , and maintenance 
of-way employees \'iho work on the rails and roadbed. In acldi tion 
to t he t1-•renty-one ~;~tandard unions, t here are a number of others, 
including the unions of the train porters (red-caps), sleeping-
car porters, coo ks, waiters, etc. l'fi th this conglomeration of 
unions it is self-evident that any attempt to delineate the area 
of collective bargaining becomes difficult. 
Only a brief mention of some of the economic characteris t ic:: 
of the railroad industry is possible. The financial position 
of the railroad ;,·Jas precarious. At the end of 1940, almost a 
IL. Lester, Richard A., op. cit., p.768. 
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!third of th-? total railroad mileage of the United States \vas in 
the hands of trustees or receivers.1 At that time another third 
was in trouble while the remaining third was in good shape, vti th 
some roads showing good earnings . 
'rhis situation \'las due large ly to the result of the drastic 
~ecline in the demand for rail transportation over the last decade. 
The pe. st years had been difficult ones for the railroad industry 
with 1 938 one of the worst 1n its history. 
'rhere is no single cause of this unprecedente·d decline in 
r raffic volume. After 1929 the depression was the most impor-
~ant. But even before that other forces were operating. Struc-
~ural and technolo gical changes in industry such as the reloca-
tion of 1hdustrial plants, the development of' hyd.roelectric pOi'l-
er, increased use of natural gas as a substitute for coal, and a 
greater efficiency in the use of coal as a fuel have cut down 
railroad tonnage. Perhaps more important has been the grov1ing 
competition of other forms of transportation. The railroads 
~oubtless will continue to be the backbone of our transportation 
system but because of intensified competition they are getting a 
~maller part of the total. 
The ·.decline in the volume of railroad business was accompan-
~e d by an even greater decline in employment. A part of' this 
~ecline was due to technolo gical displacement. This was parti-
cularly true during the second half of the 1920 1 s v1hen the roads 
1L. vlolf' Harry D.' "Railroads. II (In Twentieth Century Fund, 
H011 Collective Bargaining 1~Torks, New York, 1942, p. 319.) 
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spent large sums to improve their physical p1ant and rolling 
stock. Heavier locomotives, longer and faster trains,extension 
and consolidation of divisions , automatic tram control and im-
proved technique in trac k laying and maintenance are but a few of 
the many changes which cut do\'m jobs for all classes of employees . 
In addition, railroad employment is subject to seasonal 
I 
~luctuation. Heavy frei ght movements from different sections of 
the country occur in different months, necessitating a consider-
ably larger total number of employees than the monthly average 
reported by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Some of t he in-
dividua1 roads and certain occupa tiona l groups, such as mainten-
ance-of-the- v-ray employees, experience even greater seasonal flue-
tuations than is indicated by Commission statistics for all roade 
combined. 1 Yet the railroad i ndustry i s still one of t he largest 
employers i n the Unit 2d States. The average number of ;,;r or kers 
'employed by Class I railroads for the year 1940 was about 
1,027 ,000. The total payroll was slightly ih excess of $1.96 -
billion . 
A brief review of the history of l abor relations of the 
railroad industry shows t ha t until recent years industrial dis-
putes continually disrupted the railroad s ystems. 2 The strikes 
1 ~pon the Gould system in the 1880's and the Pullman strike of 
1894 involved the entire country. In 1907, 1909, 1 910, 1914, . 
and 1916 there was widespread strife upon the railroads. ~he 
1. Wolf, Harry D., op. cit., p.322. 
2. u.s., N.L.R.B., Division of Economic Research. Bulletin no.4, 
"Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining . 11 1tlashing-
ton, D.C., 1940. p.llg . 
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early strikes were bitterly fought, for the most part over the 
issue of union organization and ': the _ right to bargain collectivel~· .. 
he violence and rioting accompanying the strike of 1877 have 
seldom been equalled in American history. Althou gh industrial 
strife on the railroads continued after the 1890's the old bit-
terDess disappeared,but a cooperative spirit was still slow to 
develop. 
By 1888 the engineers, firemen, condu ctors, switchmen, and 
master mechanics had 1>~Jell established unions. But after the 
!decline of the Kni ghts of Labor in t he latter part of the 1880's 
at least one half of the railroad. vmrkers remained unorganized 
until the World War period when organization was considerably ex 
tended. After the 1-1a:r-, a vlidespread open-shop campaign spread 
to the railroads affecting particularly the shopmen and other 
groups that had become well organized during the preceding years • 
. ~he difficulties culminated in the shopmen's strike of 1922, 
which disrupted many of the newer organizations and resulted in 
the formation of company unions (system associations) on the 
majority of the roads. With the passage of the Railway Labor 
act in 1 926 and its am800ment in 1934, the ri ght of the vJorkers 
to be free from employer intercession in their labor activities 
was affirmed, and after 1934 l abor organization was extended 
rapidly to cover practically every occupation . 
The rail1'i'ay workers were fo r tunate in having the protection 
of law almost ten years before workers in other industrie~. The 
strongest weapon an employer had a gainst union organization was 
· his and 
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to blacklist workers vlho joined a union. By providing that em-
ployers may not foster nor support labor organization and by 
prohibiting the "yellovl do g contract 11 the Railway Labor Act pro-
tected the ri ghts of self-organization among railiva·y workers. 
While organization v1as being introduced in some sections of 
the industry for the first time, collective bargaining throu~h 
" ~ 
written agreements had already appeared. The train and e~gine 
service organ izations had sectn'ed agreements as early as 1880 
but no w a two-fold development was takin g place: an extension 
pf the collective bargaining process to cover all carriers 
and occuptions and a development of form and content of the 
trade agreement. 
In addition to this lengthening and classification of the 
written a greement, there has been a trend to v1ard uniformity in 
its provisions. One is t he us e of national a greements \'i'here in 
addition t o the extension of ind ividual labor agreements the 
practice of hol d i ng joint conferences be tween re presentatives 
of most of the Class I railroads of the country and representa-
tives o f one or more classes or crafts of railroad employees and 
~a king agreements of one kind or another having nation-wide ap-
~lica tion had assume d growing proportions. ·rhe trend to\'lard 
~niformity was observed in another d irection. At least three 
~ourths of the carrie rs have a greements with shop-craft unions. 
irhe significant thing is that many of the unions, operating up~ 
lpn a national basis, have secured similar pro vis ions for all the 
carriers. 
Joint conferences b e tween representatives o f railway manage-
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ment and the unions constitute the basic machinery of collective 
barga ining . 1 The law itself requires such conferences and speci-
fies the time within which they must be held. In addition, 
there is the participation of ti•TO Federal boards, the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board and the National Mediation Board. 
Neither of these i'Vill handle a case without proof that the re-
quired conferences have been held or refused. 
Most agreements are negotiated by a single union and the 
mana gement of an individual railroad system . Hov1ever, some of 
the unions engage in concerted bargaining; the railv1ay employees 
department of the AFL has become a specialized bargaining agent 
f or its member unions in some fptances. The central association 
of carriers, the Association of American Railways , and similar 
organizations for the unions, the Railway Labor Executives As-
sociation, some times appoint conference committees to make regi-
onal or national agreements . Through the device of imitatio:t::t, 
too, the provisions tend to become Uniform; an agreement estab-
lished on a large carrier will frequently become a model for 
agreements on other roads. 
Reasons for the success of fairly stable relations on the 
railroads are not accidental . Management and men have learned 
through joint conferencooand multi-employer bargaining the su-
periority of ne gotiation over force. Legislation has played a 
strong role in encouraging and strengthening the bargaining 
pro cess and the 1·mr k of the National l'-ledia tion Board deserves 
1. u.s., N. L.R.B., Division of Economic Research . Bulletin no.4, 
on.cit., p.l22. 
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commendation. Still the mutual acceptance of collective bar-
gaining and its elaborate machinery , and an attitude of respon-
sible participation on the part o-f both management and labor in 
multi-employer bargaining, has emerged and has been the cause of 
a system of peacefUlrather than turbulent industrial relations. 
IV 
To summarize briefly the chapter, it mi ght be well to re-
state the objectives. The purpose was to trace the grovTth of 
multi-employer bargaining in the Uni ted States in selected manu-
facturing, extractive, and service industries and to show t0At 
throu gh the use of this type of bargaining a major contribution 
to~rrards peace and order was made in previously chaotic and dis-
tressed industries . 
This order and stabilization, in varying degrees , can be 
pointed out in the glass bottle industry, where despite its 
secondary importance to the national economy, there is a suc-
cessful record of fifty years of peaceful union-management re-
lations, v..rhich may be traced in a large portion to multi-employe tr 
oargaining. The stove industry , also , despite its de clining im-
~o rtan ce and static conditions, maintained peaceful rela tions so 
successfully due to this type of bargaining, that members of the 
Association preferred the security of a union-enforced equality 
to the competitive dangers of non-union operation. The hosiery 
indust r y faced a greater problem in some instances t han the 
others, due to the hLense competition, yet withthe aid of multi-
employer bargaining and the Impartial Chairmanship, stability 
-
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and industrial peace v1ere fairly well achieved . 
I realize that effective stabilization and elimination of 
poor management-union relations in the bituminous coal industry 
has not been achieved, yet it must be admitted that the confer-
ence type of agreement has been a positive influence tov1ard 
stabilization and as such has made a great contribution to the 
goals of peace and order. As far as the railroad industry is 
concerned, stabilization was aided immeasurably by legislation, 
but a gain the great contribution ofmliti-employer bargaining to 
the fairly stable union-management relations must be actmowl-
edged. 
In conclusion, it mi ght be ~~ell to be realistic. and recog-
nize that many other e conomic factors have aided in fostering 
peaceful labor r elations in t hese industries, yet one of the 
largest contributions has been the hne ption and maintenance of 
multi-employer collective bargaining. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ADMINISTRATION OF ~lULT I-EYJ.PLOYER AGREE!-!ENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the presentation of this thesis a section should be de-
~ted to a clearly defined discussion of the administration of 
b ulti-em ployer a greements. In rela tion to t he general thesis, 
this chapter attempts: (1) to describe the nature of different 
types of a greements with some of the administrative problems 
vrhich are encountered; and (2) to discuss the varying effects of 
each one of these a greements upon ''!ages, prices, distribution of 
the labor force and technolo gical change, and to point out that 
~nee the administrative problems are overcome, these a greements 
can be u t ilized to bring about stable and orderly rela tions. 
This chapter is so organized that the introduction discusses 
briefly the definition of wage uniformity. Since it is felt that 
industry-wide bargaining affects most strongly the area of wages, 
the greater emphasis will be on equalization of employee earnings 
:lh ich is discussed in Section II. In Section III less important 
Jaffects such as the effect of these varying types of a greements 
bn prices, distribution of t he labor force and tecbnolo gical in-
~ovations are discussed, and finally in Section IV conclusions 
are presented. 
Most d iscussions of industry-wide bargaining are limited to 
IGhe advantages and to the disadvantages t hat derive from applying 
uniform policies or standard concUtions of Hork to a number of 
competing business enterprises. Hoi·Jever , a problem arises in 
the marked varia tions between t he actual policies adopted in var 
ious situations, where an effort to stabilize 'Wo rking conditions 
is being made. It is assume d tbat the policy of i ndustry- wide 
bargaining is to "take wages out of competition" and to achieve 
uniformity. The exact policy that is followed in 11 ta king vra. ges 
ou t of competition, 11 vrill have a great influence on the success 
or failure of t he joint e mployer rela tionship itself. There is 
a strong feelin g that there are 'tlidely divergent consequences 
that result from attempts in industry-"~:Jide bargaining to obtain 
u n iformity of the various elements of the wage bargain. Inves-
tigat ion in a number of industries in vlhich this type of barga in 
ing bas been adopted sho1·1 s that there bas been various kinds. of 
wage uniformity with widely varying economic effects.l 
There are many types of vcage uniformity v'lhich have been 
chosen as goals in the different industries in v-rhich industry-
vi ide bargaining is practiced. These types are different and it 
11ould. seem that the more fully one type is achieved, the more 
thorou ghly the others are violated. I~ one type is more com-
pletely accomplished it makes it difficult or impossible to sue-
ceed in the other types. Therefore wage policy under :industry-
wide bargainins usually repre sents a co mbination of the basic 
types, reached by a series of co mpromises where the bargaining 
1. Ken.nedy, Thomas (Preface, George 'It-T . Taylor), 'rhe Significance 
of I'Ja ge Uniformity. University of Penns ylvania Press, Penn., 
1949. p .iii. 
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parties try to get the greatest benefit possible by pursuing 
each t ype of uniformity to the point vrhe re the a dvantages re-
ceived from ' it are seemingly equal to the disadvantages which it 
causes b y preventing othe r t ypes of uniformity. 
II 
The types of wa ge uniformity a greements and relationships 
which will be discussed in order are as follows: 
1. Uniformity of rate per unit of output 
2. Uniformit y of rate per hour of labor 
3. Uniformity of rate changes 
There are other t ypes o f wage uniformity but since these are the 
most i mportant, di scussion vlill be confined to the types l isted 
above. In this section, after t .hey .have been defined, these 
t ypes of uniformities will be discussed in terms o f their effect 
on equalization o f employee earnings. 
Following this orde r, the definition of uniformity of. rate 
per unit of output and its effect on equalization of employee 
earnings is the first to be d.iscussed. Uniformity of rate per 
unit of output1 must be considered 'ilher9 we mean t he same rate 
for the same unit of output r egardless of the type of equipment 
or the conditions of 1-10rk. Under t his type of uniformity t he 
earning s o f eac h il'ld ividual v10rker depends on the number of unit 
of product which he t u rns out. ~ven if the pro duction condition 
1n all of the p l ants of the industry v·re re t he same, the e ffici-
ency of the -vwrkers t hems e lves would cau se v a riation s in t he ir 
~ 
earnings. 1rlith c9.reful screening , s e l e ction and p l !:i cement it 
1. Kennedy, Thomas, ou. cit., p .l7. 
70 
mi ght be pos s i bl e to minimize the varia tionl but there is still < 
variance in t he ir earnings whe r e uniform piece rates are paid, 
unless production i s cont rolled by the l aborer or t he time e le-
ment i s controlled by t he mac hine. But because the av e rage ef-
ficiency o f t he wo r kers varies fro m plant to plant in a n indu s tr 
t he plant averas es o f earn ings of wo r ke rs are also certain to 
vary and would do so even i f pro duction condi tions were t he s ame 
in all plants. 
Another consideration is that production conditions vary 
from plant to plant in diff erent indu stries. Because o f better 
raw materials, equipment, supe rvision or othe r factors some 
plants ma i nta i n a mo re eff icient orgru1 ization than others. Be-
wor kers "fary from plant to plant, because of this. 
The second. type of uniformit y is t hat o f the rate pe r hour 
of labor of a particular t ype. 2 This type is prevalent where 
t here a re standard hourly wage rat es common throu ghout an indus t y. 
Usually , a standard hourly rate for each occupation is stipulate ' 
in the bargaining contract. Different jobs are paid a uniform 
hourly r a te. The only problem that mi ght arise is that of de-
1./ Tiffin, Josephr Industrial Psycho lo "5y. Prentice Hall, N.Y., 
1946 . p.l9. 'The industrial psy chologist recognizes that a 
goo d personnel man will detect a ll of the obvious, and many 
of t he subtle, reas ons why some applicant s should, and others 
should not be placed upon a s pecific job." 
2. Kennedy, Thomas, op . cit., p .26 . 
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termination, of vmrk jurisdictim or l'lhere there mi sht be overlap 
p in g of jobs. Another diffi culty that might occur is when rates 
are based on jobs, not on occupations, because separate jobs mus 
be analyzed fro m time to time if hourly earnings are to c onform 
with the type of wo r k performed . 
This type of nniformity affects production tnroughthe 
vwrker's earnings. There is no incentive for the wor ker to ex-
ert more effort since a ll VJorkers receive the same pay regardles 
of production. There will be no mone tary incentive for the 1.1ork] 
er to move from an inefficient plant to an efficient one, with t ie 
result t hat these conditions are perpetuated until the ineffici-
ent plant ca,1not stand the losses incurred. 
If the uniformity of rate per hour of l a bor is achieved in 
I. 
'an industry it will be at the expense of other incentive systems 
I'.C he only place . that it can be achle.ved in a piece work system is 
\·1here the p ro duction per hour is controlled by the worker or 
machine s o that a fixed quantity per hour is turned out. But 
his type of control varies m ·<iifferent industries and is diffi-
cult to control. This also cLiffers fr® -:mte per unit of skill 
land effort since the wo r ker under r a t e pe r hour of l abor, kno,,IinJ 
that his pay remains the same, vrill not exert as much effort, but 
oth receive the s a me pay . Therefore one type of uniformity 1;-.1il 
e achieved in an inctustry but usually at the expense of another 
The third t ype of wage uniforrni ty i s the nniforrni ty of rate 
changes1 This can be achieved by adding to or removing from the 
existing wage structure of the industry a uniform layer of pay . 
Kennad _ 
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vmat happens is not necessarily the equalization o f wage rates 
throughou t the industry, but a perpetuation of the s ystem which 
existed before the increase or decrease. We must differentiate 
betv.Jeen percentae;es of existing rates or Vlhether it shall be 
cents per hour . Although percentage increases leave t he struc-
ture the same 'da y it vras, n everthe less it must be remembered 
that a pe rcentage increase on a h i gh v.rage wili cause a hisher 
differential in actual cents per hour than vTill a percentage in-
crease on a smaller vrage, lovJ"er in the job scale, thus causing a 
.further widening o f the range bet1.;een the lov1er and hi e;her wages 
i 
A.n across the board cents-per':"'hour chan3e will modify the job 
stru c ture that existed previously. 
·Under t h is type of uniformity the a verage vm ge i n t he indus-
try may be highe r or lo;.·!er . than it would have been v·Ti th no uni -
formity at all. By accepting uniform c hanges of rates the union 
g ives up a l l cla im s to very h i gh increases fro m t hose companies 
i'l ith exce 9t ionally lar.ge resources or a bi ll ty to pay , vlhile the 
ine fficient or marg inal firms lose the opportunity to get s malle 
increases or large r decreases because of their particular inabil -
ty t o p9,y . This g ives rise to the opinion that in competitive 
industries uniform r a te changes keep the average 1t1age fro m ris-
ing too high in prosperity or f a lling too low in de p r es sion . 
A problem to consider in using t h is un iformity is when uni-
form change s of cents-per-hour a re used . Cents-per-hour changes 
in a p i ece rate or a bonus system involve a r e setting 8 f piece 
rates so that the ea rnings pe r hour vli ll be change d commensurablj • 
itfue r e t his involves dea l ing vi ith a complicated system any devel -
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opment of a p l an which ':l ill accomplis h uniform rate of changes 
will be d ifficult . 
It must be remembered that if uniform rate changes are used 
it cl oes not necessarily result in equitable v1age rates in the 
i ndustry unle ss that c ondit ion existed before. It prevents wid-
en in; a n d narrowing of t he policy existing v.rhether equitable or 
not. 
III 
Althou gh the vary ing types of uniformity have been dis cusse c 
in terms of equalizing e mplo yee earnins s, their effect on the 
stabilization of prices is an i mportant consideration. Iv1any com 
panies enga ge in indus try-v.ride bargaining to stabilize pro ductior 
costs, uh ich in turn •dill help to eliminate 11 cut-throat !co mpe-
ti tion 11 and brinr.: about 1)rice stabilization. The success itlhi ch 
' ~ -
may be achieved b v these types of uniformity depends lar'gely on 
t he percentage of labor costs to total costs. It is readily 
seen that i n most of t he industries in '\·lhich industry-1-vide bar-
gain.L.1.g takes place,. labor costs are a large part of total costs" 
Industry stabilization can be a chieved if in using t he 'lini-
formity of rat3 per unit of output the d irect labor costs per 
1~nit of product in all plants are equalized . 
costs vr ill vary fro m plant to plant sin ce the 
Nevertheless, tota 
inefficient plants 'I 
l··lhich had lower piece rates than the more eff icient plants to 
start with, will hav e a ~reater varia tion in total costs as com-
pared to till' iroustry a s a whole . The greatest threat to stabili 
t y i n high labor cost industries in the past has been competitivE ! 
lowe rin q o f wages , along with urice decreases followed b v more 
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vvage decreases untUthere has been great con flict and demoraliz-
ation of t he market . ;;Vith uniformity o f rate -oe r unit of output 
!competit ion indirect l a bor co s ts can be minimized and p rice sta-
bility can be aided. 1 
Uni f orm hourly rates is another way to reach stabilization . ~ 
It presents a stron ~~ possibility o f being a chieved s lnce t h e 
rites used a re well estab l ished , are less a matter o f subje ctive 
judgment, and therefore le s s open to ch iseling . Neve rthe less it 
cannot as strongly equalize d irect labor costs as \>tell as the 
unifo!lmi ty of rate pe r unit of output and in tur n be as effectivE 
in aidin ~ pri ce stabil i ty, yet it p l ays it s part in he lping to 
p revent competit ive raising and loi,a:l n g of wa ge rates in the 
compet itive area . 
It is po ss ible through uniform chans es in r a tes to stabi liz, 
the pri ce structure of a:e1 industry . 3 This is most reaclily s een 
in the periods of depression v7here 1Jniform decreases cq..n prevent 
decreases in one p lant whi ch are used as a basis to de crease in 
other p l ants I'Th i ch later be co me the basis of ano t he r decrease in 
t he f irst p l ant . It must be remembered, however, t hat t h e per-
centage of wage costs to total costs varies between companies 
and if in one company t he wa ge costs are mu ch d ifferent than 
those prevalent for t h e industry a uniform change can have a poo 
effect on price stability . 
An important aspect o f wage uniformity is i ts ef f ect on the 
distribution of the l a bor force . The re are considerable diffe r-
l. Kennedy , 'rhomas , o p . cit., p .l9 . 
2 • Ibid : ; p • 27 • 
3 • Ibid • , p • 3 5 • 
75 
ences as to whethe r ··1age uni fo rmi t y causes goo d or bad allocatiOl . 
of the labor force. 
In te r ms o f the un ifo rmity of rate pe r unit o f output t h e 
dif fe r en ce in v-w rkers 1 earning s nave a tendency to cause l abor to 
move fro m t he i neffic ient to the efficient plant s. The i ne ffi-
cient p l ants , the r e fore, have a some1-.rhat hi gher l a bor t urnover, 
whi c h causes t otal labor cos ts , including training , to be h i gher 
than those o f t he efficient plants. In addition , t he remainder 
of v-w r ke r s t hat remain i n the inefficient plants may be less ca-
pable . Thi s would tend to cause higher Hastage and ove r head 
costs and lo we:> the quality of t h e pro du.ct . 1ilhen t he labor markeu 
i s tight, the ineff icient mills may ev en find it d ifficult to 
continue ope r a tion unde r uniform piece rates. Under this t ype 
o f un iformity, t he refore , some p ressure to either increase ef-
ficiency ··o r pay "under-the - table 11 ext r a s may be exerted by l abor 
on t he inefficient firms.l 
It mu s t be r emembe red that t h is analys is needs qualifica-
tion. It i s important to consider that the ,,.,age - differential 
factor is not a s potent a s the job-loss fa ctor in caus ing vmr-
2 ke rs to change their place of emplo yment. If this is assumed 
to be true, then this type of uniformity which results in ~,rage 
differentials but vvhich is no t a s effective in causing job los s e 
in the ma r g inal o r i nefficient firms as certain other t ypes of 
uniformity, is n ot as effective as some other t ype s :lil cau sing 
1. Kenne dy , Thomas, op, cit ,, p ,20, 
2. Dunlop, John T., "Economic Aspe cts of Industry-vlide Collectiv 
Bargaining , u Froceedin ~Zs Confe rence on Indust ry-v1 ide Collec-
tive Bar gaining , Un ive r sity of Penns ylvania Press, Penn . , 1 94 ·~ . 
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a more e conomic distribution of t he l a bor force. In other \·lords 
this un iformity of· rate per tmit of output does not place as 
strong economic pres sure on t he marginal firms as some other 
types and as a result there are fe"~Her failures a mong the margin-
lal firms . Because they remain . in business, the job-loss factor 
of l a bor mobility does not become ef£'ective . 'tlorkers are not 
fo r ced to move to the more efficient firms where their labor 
1vould be more productive . It may reasonably be concluded, there 
fore, t ha t it is not as effective as so me of the other t ypes in 
bringin ,~ about a more e conomi c dist ribution of the labor re-
sources of t h:; country. 
Because worke rs' earnings are the same in all companies 
under un iformity of r ate per hour of l abor, the -vm ge differentia 
factor is not act ive as a cause of l a bor mobil ity. On the other 
hand, s ince this is one of t he most effective types in elimina-
ting marg inal or inefficient firms , it vJou l d seem that it is 
very effective in activating the more potent job-loss factor of 
l abor mobility. In t hi s particular cas e it woul d seem that 
throu gh this t ype of uniformity it vwul d be possible to achieve 
a more economic d istributioD. of labor resources. 
An anal ys is of the effect of "uniformi ty of rate changes" 
on l abor mobility is difficult to obtaln. To the extent that 
wage ineqctities are preserved , . they cont inue to exercise their 
usual pressure in thls respect . Likewise, to the extent that 
uniformit y of changes in rates prevents marginal firms from se-
curing further special a dvantages necessary to ke ep them in busi 
ness, the more potent job-loss factor of l a bor mobility is acti~ 
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I 1\Ta ted. This vmuld seem to result in a more economic distribution 
I 
bf t he labor force than ,,;oul d occur under "no uniformity," or 
j"u~iformi t y of total costs. 11 
Another area of discussion is the effects of industry- Hide 
pargaining on technolo gical progress and the d istribution of the 
1
bains accruing from such changes.l This can be discussed in term~ 
of uniformity of rate per unit of output and uniformity of rate 
I 
per hour of l abor. Since piece rates per unit of output stay 
I 
t he same re gardless of the manner in which production is carried 
~n, technolo gical changes have little effect on direct labor 
basts. The v1o rkers ga in in increased pay , but management gains 
I 
~n decreased operating costs along \vi t h an increase in quality 
I 
~hich may lead to higher prices. But the major gain goes to la-
1 bor since the new equipment and other means of increasing effici-
~ncy usually r e quires a dditional finan cial outlays vlhlch add to 
~he overhead costs. Therefore the advantages of any tecn~ological 
!change i n costs o t ':.1e r t han l abor must be large enough to give 
I ~he emplo ye r an incentive to be pro gressive. Since the incentive 
f o provide technolo gical advancement is difficult to provide, 
bffective capital investment is hindered . 
I Also to be cons ldered are those industries t<here l abor costs 
~re equalized. Here t he employees do not oppose technolo gical 
pro gress since there i s a ga in to t he union in terms of h i ghe r 
I earnin~s . In many cases the employees have demanded and in some I -~ 
:cases have helped to finan ce technolo gical changes. As far as 
I 
~ - Kennedy, Thomas, op. cit., p.22. 
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uniformity of rates per hour o f l abor, strong encouragement has 
I . 1 
r een glven to technolo gical change. Since the hourly rates for 
110rkers stay the same regardless of the number of units pro du ced 
~er worker , any increase in production per worker reduces labor 
I 
icosts. This in turn gives management incentive to install l abor 
r aving devices • Althou gh labor does not get a vmge cut, t hey 
. soon find t hat ea rnings are not increased by the improvements 
I n d t here may be the possibility o f layoffs. \vor l:ers ·who are 
employed under a uniformity of hourly rates are usually a gainst 
the installation of l a bor saving devices since it constitutes a 
threat to job s ecurity . 
The effect of tec~lllological advan ce on industry-wide bar-
gaining can be felt in two ways . 2 The union to gethe r vrith the 
!
employers (a s co mpe titors) may try to hinder it by restricting 
1
i t or refusing to make t he necessary w·age adjustments which a re 
eeded t o introduce it. On t he other han d the employer~ might 
insist on t he ri ght t o t he intro duction o f labor saving meth~ds 
Iunder guaranteed safeguards to the ivor kers. These safeguards 
may or may not be as restrictive as those that strong locals 
mi ght enforce in the local bargaining area, but t hen aga in the 
employers of t he members of weake r locals might force an earlier 
change with l ess r e strictive terms. The re is the possibility of 
effecting a reasonable compromise. This is where you will have 
an administered rate of t e chnological change along with an ad-
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1~ Ke~~edy , Thomas , o~. cit., p.28 . 
2. ivicCabe, David A. ,Problems of Industry- '\'Tide or Regiona l Trad L_ 
Agreements, 11 Americang-commic Review, Vol. XXXIII, No.1, 
Har ch 194 3, p:.-'ii2'-173. 
ninistered change o f wage rates. In view o f public i nterest and 
poncern it is probable that both mana gement and the union will 
;1-esitate to take any steps that might l ead to public condemnation 
IV 
In summarizing , it can be readily observed that t nere are 
I variety of t ypes of uniformi t J \vh ich may be achieved under ~ulti-employerbargainins , which are not complementary and in ~any cases prevent conflict. The economic effects of t hese sev-
1 ral types are qu ite different and vlhe r e one presents an advan-~age over another type ; , by t he same reasoning suffers by compar 
son with s oms othe r ~spect . 
Since it _is assumed t hat these types of uniformity are ':lOrk-
~ble, on ce the difficu ltie s are remove d , it would seem possible 
Jhat wa ge uniformity can be ach ieved t hrough cooperation of labor 
,.nd mana gement. Although the p roblem seems co mplicated and un-
1 
t eal, if industries wan t it enou gh it i s technica l l y possible, 
~nd no more unreal or co mplicated than the problem industries 
~aced i n ma king piece rate s ystems, years a go. 
In concludin g 1 t s eems that one area of consideration whi ch 
should not be neglected. is the effect of 1.vage uniformit y on the 
l tti tude of management .1 A strong opinion is expressed that in 
1-he face of a union policy of vm ge c onf o r m! ty the employers 1.vill 
i avor this type o f bargaining . Bargaining will be facilitated as 
~ oon a s the employer !mov1 s that the industry~\vide a greement does 
lot solidify into t he industry a union they might otherwise have 
• McCabe, David A., on. cit., p.l69 . 
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]gotten rid . of. 'rfuere competition is bris k and l abor costs a 
I 
arge part of total costs, the employers should be glad to get 
i n dustry-wide barga i ning . Otherwise the y may have to fight a 
I trons nat iona l union in isolated individual-employer bargaining . 
' j One of the most ser ious obstacles t o i ndus try- -w ide a gr eement 
been the unwillin511ess of e mployers in lo·w-wage areas to s ive 
p t he ir differentials along wi t h the unwillingness o f the nation 
union and employers in the hi gher-v1age areas to a pprove an 
greement calling for its continuance. 
One school of t hought s:;ems to feel t hat t here is a justifi-
,ation of lower rate s by lowe r livin g costs in t he locality, or 
b.Sgher pro duction costs or transportation costs. But t he ten-
' ency is toward les s geo graphical nonuniformity in wa ges in com-
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CHAPTER 5 
EVALUATION OF MULTI-EiviPLOYER BARGAINING 
INTRODUC'I' ION 
This chapter proposes to evaluate the advantages and dis-
advantages of multi-employer bargaining and to shovl by certain 
selected criteria the relationship of this type of bargaining to 
the "most efficient allocation of resources." 
The method used is t o list briefly in Section I the advan-
tages and disadvantages of multi-employer bargaining. In Sectio 
II the advantages are discussed along Hith their relation to · the 
economic principle, while Section III deals with the disadvan-
tages in muc h the same way . Section IV summarizes briefly the 
pertinent thou ghts and points out certain conclusions . 
I 
There are many advantages and disadvantages tD~t could be 
discussed but the particular advantages to be presented in this 
chapter, in the vlriter's opinion, lend themselves more easily to 
analysis t han the others . Nevertheless, the choices are arbi-
trary and may lead to a discussioh as to the validity of the se- , 
lections. For the purpose of this thesis the advantages to be 
discussed are the ones mentioned most frequently and thus some 
criteria of choice are used for selection. 
In connection i'i'it h these selections, equalization o f bar-
multi -employer barga ining counteracts strong power positions and 
I! 
~-1 ~l: 8~ 
11 protects the bargaining povTers from each, other 's a buses. Anothe r 
I s trong reason, presented in othe r chapters of the thesis, is the I/ 
I stability provided by this t ype of bargaining where 1-1age costs 
,j . ji 
tr are taken out of compet ition and cu t throat competition is elimi-
nated . The l ast advanta ge proposes that standardization and uni 
, formity of interpretation is provided; that t here is uniform ~on-jl 
li certed action based on standardize d procedure and. that t here ls 
a united front whi ch in turn prevents whipsa1ving and. provides a 
1 communit y of interest. 
I Amon g the disadvantages of mu lti-employe r ba r gaining is 
!I first, the possibility of monopoly. Althou gh advantageou s to 
either one of the bargaining parties, monopoly distorts the 
11 
I\ 
il 
most eff icient allocation of resources and reduces the real in- I! 
J come o f the consumer. This type of bargaining may •:li pe out area JI 
l
and ~eo graphical differential s. fhis ma y hinder free access to 
, the ~ab:r ~arkets and a t the same time i gnore local varia tions 
1: in economic and social factors. Finally, since this t ype of 
!j bargaining leads to greater unionization and in turn stron :ser 
lf unions, the incidence o f the strike burden becomes much heavier 
land results in crippling of production and output. 
I 
Thus it can be seen that for every advantage quoted a dis -
1! advantage can be po inted out and no cleC~-r p ictu re is immediately ll 
apparent. 
I 
j! 
,I ,, 
II 
This section deals with the advantages of multi-employer 
1\ bargaining • The first advantage is equalization of bargaining 
.. ·11 
I 
power . lJf...a.nagement in this case would enjoy a strong financial 
position with strategic control over the employment . of labor. 
The union , on the other hand , vmuld also have a strong financial 
position, strength o f numbers and control over the supply of 
labor. If the parties are not of appr•oximately equal strength 
one may choose t o impose its will on the other rather than to 
bargain. As both unions and management have increased in size 
and bargaining strength, a corresponding increase in the size of 
bargaining unit is ind icated. 
11The ultimate sanction behind the bargaining process is a 
test of economic strength, a trial b y combat. rrl 'rhis quotation 
expresses full well the attitude of the bargaining po'\vers and in 
certain instances can be justified and in .as many othe r examples 
criticized. In this respect, ho wever, multi - employer bargaining 
might tur-D out to be a weapon rathe r than a cooperation-promotin 
technique in industrial relations. 2 In every soctal conflict 
the v.reaker group tries continually to achieve at least an equali 
7 ation o f strength. Collective barga ining ae. such, grew out of 
the re co gnition that the individual worker 's bargaining po1ver 
was no match for the bargaining strength of the employer. On 
the other hand, it has become a pparent that the bargaining pov1er 
of an individual employer is no match for the bargaining strengt 
of a union which controls the labor force fro m 'ilhich he has to 
1. Reynolds, Lloyd G., Labor Economics and Labor Relations . 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., N.Y., 1949 • . p.287.. 
2. Pollak, Otto, Social Implications of Industr~-Wide Bargainin~ 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Penn., 1949. p .ll. 
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,I 
'I I 
draw his employees . In many industries individual employers 
cannot afford to resist union demands because a strike vlould 
mean loss of business to competitors. Thus it is maintained I 
that both the union and management are protected against any un- 1 
I 
orthodox methods used by one or the other to gain 11ends 11 and the 1 
I 
i 
I 
lpower patterns are checked by an equalization of bargaining 
_ - I II 
A very important advantage that supporters of multi-employer 
power. 
bargaining maintain is the provision of stability in the industr~ . 
" I 
Stabilization, in ' this case, means standardized collective bar-
gaining procedure, within a stabilized framevwrk, representing J I 
I 
I I 
the vJelfare of the 1-1hole ih:il),s try rather than the needs of parties 
I' 
bargaining individually. This stability o:r labor standards, 11 
therefore, allows elimination o f cutt~~oat competition and peace ~ 
ful industrial relat ions. I 
I 
Frequently, a chievement of this aim is dependent upon eli- I 
I 
mina t ion of competition betv1e en firms in the sphere of \"lage 
I - 1 
rates . The more competitive t he indust ry, the smal ler the 
units in t he indu stry , and t he l ess responsible the employers, 
the greater is t he likel ihood that union wa ge policy Hill seek 
i 
I 
cOmpetitive parity in l abor cost as a measure to r e lieve oressur 
on the vmge structure. In an indu.stry where there is con~iderab~e 
I 
variat ion in t he size and efficien cy of the individual firms, I 
a union mi sht :reel that compe tition >tould be eliminated by equalf 
1
1 . Bloom, Gordon F., and Northup, Her~ert R., Economics o f L?_bor j 
and Industrial Re l ations. Blakiston Co ., Philadelphia, 1950~ l p.4~ . I 
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ization of the 1,.,rages in the v:arious plants under union jurisdic-
tion. Of course, not all unions st r ive for tm.iformity--and as 
far as organization i s concerned, national a greements are in the 
distinct minority--but nevertheless the fact that many unions 
prefer equalization merits cons ideration in any evaluation of thE 
effect of wa ge uniformities. 
It is questionable, however, whether apparent equality of 
wage s really results in equa li t y of labor costs as has been re g-
ularly asserted by proponents of multi-employer bargaining . 1 It 
is true, however, that this type of bargaining preserves certain 
standards of wa ge s 1.,lhich make it impossible fo r ma.nufacturers tc 
maintain themselves in business and to compensate for their in-
efficiency by paying vm ges lo ·wer than the standard 1.-lhich prevailE 
in the . industry. Furthermore, multi-employe r collective bargain· 
ing p revents employers with poor personnel policies from gaining 
competitive advantages and forcing thElir ovn questionable prac-
tices upon the whole industry. Thus mul ti-employt3l" ~Jargaining 
prevents the demoralization which results from the law of com-
peting standards which in bad times tends to depress all '!tlages 
to the lowest possible l evel. It is significant that the most 
insistent demand for the stabilization of wo r king conditions 
came as an aftermath of the demoralization of wage standards sub 
sequent to 1929. 
The policing pov1er of the union Hhich this type of bargain-
ing permits to f unction effectively tends also to hold uniform 
1. Pollak, Otto, op. cit., p.46. 
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labor standards at a level which makes it impossible for finan-
cially weak employers to invade or mainta in themselves in the in 
dustry . l This prevention of shoestring operators from attach ing 
to an industry has also helped to preserve the investment of 
stronger firms. This ivas ~tlell demonstrated in the needles trade 
Ii i th their oversuppl y of contractors. At t racted b y the small or 
iginal outlay required to set up shop and encouraged b y jobbers 
vlho were interested in 'b .. a ving cutthroat competition among the 
contractors, many of the latter estab l ished themselves in that i -
dustry b y underbiddin g re gula rly o perating shops . This oversup-
ply of contractors resulted in chaoti c conditions which t J:reatene 
the stabil i ty o f the earlier established shops just as much as 
the living standards of the vmrker and labor peace in the .indus-
try . f.'iult i-employer bargaining made .it possible to regulate tha 
situation b y enforcing labor standards ~;hich excluded many ~;ould~ 
be contractors i.vho othe r"tr-lise vmuld have floc ked into the induSt!j 
and b y binding the jobbers not to g ive the ir goods ou t t o new 
contractors in the mi dst o f t he s eason. In so doing , they ere-
ated economic stability in that part o f t he needle trades and im 
proved the social as vrell as the economic soundness of their 
structure . Thus any argument in favor of multi-employer bargain ! 
ing ult i ma tely resolves itself in the resolution that elimina t.io 
of cutthroat competition based on e~lo itation of wages can be 
achieved b y adherence to uniformity of wa s es v-rhich, they main-
tain, brings about stable and orderly i ndustrial relations. 
l.J.6 1. Pollak, Otto, op . cit . , p • . • 
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Another important strong reason advanced for the use of mul· 
ti-employer bargaining is that through this type of bargaining, 
standardization and uniformity of interpretation is ,. ppovided; : re..:.; __ 
sulting in a united front, limiting whipsawing . This is based 01 
a standardization of job descriptions, job evaluations, and term 
inolo gy as well as of wages and workins conditions. There would 
jbe no uniform ans~ov-ers to questions and. if arbitration is providec, 
for, uniformity will be maintained with far fewer cases because 
of the general applicability of one decision. 
This would limit the persistence of a purely self- centered 
attitude of labor in that multi -employer bargaining lJITOuld cen-
tralize the ne gotiations in such a 1-vay as t o prevent the collec-
tion of general informat ion regarding the situation of the indus 
try as a 1.1hole . Many of their data either vrould not be collecte , 
at a ll or would not be evaluated in their over•all significance 
of bargaining occurred on a plant-vlide basis. In order to achiei e 
uniform irV"age standards, hoi-vever, the :inlustry situation as a v-TholE 
must be considered . This also prevents the union from employing 
whipsaw tactics based only on the profit position of the indivi-
dual company. On the other hand, under this method of bargain-
ing , employers are equally forced to consider industry interests 
rather than company interests. 
Fu.:cthermore, the necessity of s.eeing the industry picture aE 
a "'rhole in order to be able to carry on industry-wide negotiatior s 
has made many union leaders experts in the problems of the indus j 
try. The tas k of negotiating this t ype of agreement or of fore-
inp: the rank and file into a ccentance of the a greements which 
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must necessarily be a compromi s e be tween vrhat the individual lo-
cals could have achieved from the strongest and what t hey would 
have had to a c?ept fro m the · vveakest e mployers, increases respon-
sibility and realization of each other's position . 
The experience in the hosiery industry during the thirties 
goes far in pointing out the development of labor leadership fro , 
a ggressive antagonism to responsible cooperation. Union officia s 
\'lho before the establishment of mult i-employer bargaining had 
been concerned ma inly with organization activities accepted un-
popular responsibilities after reco gnition, . thus providing for a 
community of interest betvl8en union and management . 
III 
\!lith the advent of multi-employer bargaining , certain criti 
cisms arose, not only of the harmful actions that a ctually existE. d 
and l"lere perpetrated, but a lso o f i mplied and possible harmful 
a ctions. Amon~ the most important criticisms of multi-employer 
bargaining is the accusation of monopoly. 
In presenting t his problem it mi ght be i'rell to di'rell briefl 
on the characteristics of unionism in gene ral as a monopoly be-
fore going on to d iscuss multi - employer bargaining as an example 
of monopoly power. 
It can be argued that unions have achieved a significant de 
gree of monopoly.l By monopoly wage policy more is meant t han 
just pushing wage rates u p to levels "ivhich cause :inflation or un-
1 . Lindblom, Charles E., "The Union as a Monopoly," Q).larterly 
Journal of Economics, Harvard Unive rsity Press, Cambridge , 
November 1948, p . 672 . 
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emp lo yment. There is no way to p rove d irectly t ha t unions are 
novl in a po s ition t o do t h is and that t he y vlill t herefo r e procee , 
to us e t he ir ne•:J power. Instead it mi ght be s hown t hat, g iven 
union aims and pov:er, ,,,ra ges may' b e pushed t o mono polis tic l evels 
unless ce rtain chec ks or limits hold unions t o competitive rates 
It is fu rther a r a:ued that these limits are no1v inadequate. 
~ . 
Lindblom does rna lee the point t hat a s on e would e x pect, the 
po •,Jer o f the stri ke varie s from one situation to another. There 
fore it is felt that some unions 1'lill never reach monopoly 
strength; their -vrage rates vrill increase only 11ith productivity . 
Thus, s tr ictly s pe ak ing , h e feels tha t "the 11 union is not a 
monopoly; on l y this or t hat union is. But he is quic k to point 
out t hat many unions a r e strong enou gh to set in motion v1ag e 
changes 1.-1h ich ultima t e l y swee p over much o f t he economy . Then , 
s a 1vhole , "the" union is more than the sum of its parts . 
Fo r the s ake o f t he d iscussion, wa ge rates Hhich are not t h 
roduct of union monopoly power a r e called "competitive " wage 
ates . Again, these rat e s ma y not be t ho se o f "perfect " compe-
ition no r ev en auproximate t h em , s i nce in the absence of union 
s m, wa ge rates may r e flect a wide varie t y of "imperfections" in 
competition, includ ing , of cours~, monopsony . 
Competition is so much ta ken for granted, that it is easy 
o t h in k o f 'i·Ihat is calle d competitive wages as "natural,'' and i 
some iva y s inevitable a n d automatic . Actually, hoHever, there are 
I o n a tural , automatic, or inevita ble forces driving vra ges to vTha 
as here been ca lle d compe tit ive levels . There are what are 
alle d competitive for ' e 
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man-made rules and exper i ences.l The s e vmrk automa tica lly and 
inevitably only under certai.n EIJecific conditions. Therefore, 
because unionism alters rul e and cond ition, these competitive 
forces exper i ence difficulty in ma intaining co mpetitive levels. 
I t cannot be presumed t hat t here exist strong t e ndencies towards 
competitive rates. The s tructure of the mar ket is drastically 
changed b y strong unionism, and the regulatory pov1ers of compe-
titian are d isorgan ized. 
Be cause the argument on union po vier turn s on vrhat unionism 
is no w final l y able to do · to market organization, it is not ne -
cessary t o argue that union income goals are any more monopolis-
ti c than they h ave ever been. The s oals have not been changed btt 
rrathe r the union's abibiJity to achieve its goals is now much 
strengthened. Union 1:Ia ge policy is felt to be essentially oppor-
Although many "princ i ples" of v~a ge determination whicl j ~unistic. 
~e come popul ar from time to time in union ci rcle s are o f some im-
portance in the timins and strategy o f v..ra ge demands, they are in 
~any instances Vlindo11-dre ss ing . Unionists do not vJant wa ges 
~Jas ed on co st- of-l ivin g or ability-to-pay ; t he y want "more . 11 
The y feel that vvages are income and only secondary as costs. It 
is felt t~at t hey are not impres s e d with a ny argu men ts that some-
fth i n g called a 11 compe tit ive" rate i s correct, in the public in-
~erest , or in t he ir ovm intere st. For these reasons Lindblom feEls 
uhat a s f ar as aims are concerne ct , u n i onism 0..as alv~ays , t herefor) , 
~een potentially rnonpolistic and all that is miss ing is the po we •. 
~ . Lindblom, Cha rles E., ou. cit., p. 67 3 . 
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In appl yin g mo r•e specifically this monopoly criterion to t h 
multi-employer ba r ga ining question it s s ems ne cessary to see 
whether the critics o f this type o f bargaining are justified in 
t hei r argument t hat multi-employer bargaining l eads to conse-
quences 1r1hich are detrimental to t he public intere st. Such con-
sequences include the emer gence of monopolistic combinat ions be-
t we en employers and employees with resulting price-f ixing and re 
stricted pro duction, limitation of free ac cess to trade for busi-
p.essmen as well as for workers and therefor•e an increase in un-
~mp1o yment, unnecessary costs of p ro duction . 
The question co nsidered here i s the result of monopoly caus-
ing hi gher cost s and in t urn hi gher prices causing harm .to the 
consumer. A further consideration is that this monopoly can vrel 
be bilateral. 1'1ul ti-emp1o yer bar gaining can easily lead to an 
f3COno mic combination of employers and employees a gainst all peop] e 
putside these t\vo groups . ·Theoretical con s idera tions as 'Hell as 
Pactual evidence point in t hat direct ~on. 1 In return fo r higher 
wa ges, unions might not only be r eady to assist employers in con 
~rollins prices and in limiting pr oduct ion but also mi ght actua l y 
~orce them into such actions in order to s e cure industry pvofits 
li'Jhich mi ght perrn i t a raising of t he ir wage standards . 
After real izing the dange r s o f cut t hroat compe tition, t he 
~ext step to reco [,n ition o f a common inte rest o f labor and capita .1. 
~ ~ould be cartelization, at the expense of the consumer . This is 
l.n understandable development in a society which works on the 
• Polla k, Otto, op. cit~, p . 56 . 
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profit principle . \Vhe re associat ions of employees and employers 
bargain vl ith each other it vrill eas i ly sug'3est itsel f to them trut 
they can avoid conf lict and reach a mutually satisfactory arrang -
ment by passins on the cost to a third party. This solution be-
comes particularly easy and tempting where t he t h ird party is no ' 
organized and therefore not in a position to put up an ef f ective 
resistance. That such efforts have actually ta ken place in in-
dustries v1here multi-employer bargaining exists , is easy to po in , 
put. Agreements have been found to exist in cont racts of the 
oar ke r s 1 union, be t ween beauty shop O\mers and t heir emP,loyees, 
in wholesale bread delivery , in mil k distribution , and in the 
const ruction i ndustry . Arm..11.g;ments of bid depos i t6ries vlhich 
aim at t he same effect as outright price-fixing arrangeme'nts have 
po me to public attention in the Nev1 York and San Francisco elec-
1vrical indus tries, the Portland plastering industry , the Seattle 
pement industry, and t he New Yor k pa i nting industry . Thus the 
3.rgument that industry-i'ride collective bargaining implies at 
~east in some instances the danger of cartelization appears to 
be justified. 
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Anothe~ strons reason advanced for limitation of multi-emplc~­
~r bargaining i s of the opinion t hat t his t ype of bargaining may 
~ipe out a rea and geo gr aphical differentials and as a result 
[linder free access to the labor mar lmts vli thout reco gn izing local 
~ariations in economic and s ocial f a ctors. 
~ f a 
[ ove 
It might be \"i'ell to revie1-r briefly at· this time the concept 
perfectly co mpe titive labor market in ,,7hich \vorkers i.Vould 
about so freel v amon~ emplovers t hat all firms would be 
forced to pay the s a me ·wa ge rate for the same job. 1 An employer 
rrho raised wa 5es a little above the going rate would be able to 
hire anyone in t he market . An employer who reduced wages belov-1 
the going rate vwuld be deserte d by his employees . The 1r.1a ge 
rates of d ifferent firms i'Toul d be brought into line, not by col-
lective bargaining or government regulation, but b y the pre ssure 
of co mpetition for l a bor . The number of Ha rkers required by em-
players 'ltlOUl d. be equal at all time s to t he number available--the re , 
i•Ioul d be enough jobs to go around . Th e individual v.;o r ker, there I 
fore' ld'hile he could not bargain over '1rvages' wou l d be able to 
qu i t h i s job with ease and find nevi employment . 
1tl'nen it"f.s ·sai d t hat a perfect labor mar ket requires co m- I 
~lete mobility of labor , we mean b y this complete ability and 11ll 1-
1 insness to move , t hat is, propensity to move, rathe r than moveme1t 
!i tself, since if the propensity to move itJere high enough, little 
I 
actual movement ':JO Uld be necessary t o keep all th-:1 1.r.1a ge rates in 
line 1vith one another.2 1,'loveover, i n order t o have a fair :approx ·· 
imation to a ne rfect labor mar~t it is not necessary for every 
vmrker to be willing to change his job immediately . It is impor 
tant only that enough 1vorke rs be willing so that ind.ividual firmE 
can increase the ir employment Hithout rai s ing wa ges apprecia bly, 
~nd s o t hat employers who lag behind the prevailing 1vage level 
rvrill be s e riously inconvenienced. EvEm v·Iith these qualificationE ·, 
1. Reynolds, Lloyd G., op. cit., p . 345 • . 
2. lJlachlup, Fritz, ''r-1onopolistic ~:rage Determination as a Part of 
the General Problem o f Monopoly ." In Shuster, Joseph, . ed., 
Readin~s in Labor Economics and Labor Relations . J. B. Lip-
pincott Co., Ne1o; York, 1951, p. 388 ~ 
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it is evident that local labor markets in this country wou l d not 
be hi ghl y co mpetitive. 
There mi ght be some justification for re l at ively isolate d 1<-
~o r ma rkets causing a lac :r of employers' compe tition. There are 
~any instances of geographically or occupationally isola ted l abo 
markets i·.Jhere workers have no chance of a l ternative emplo yment 
and only an e xpens ive chance of moving away . In those cases co m 
petition a mong emplo ye rs i s na t urally limited ·and devia tions fron 
.uhe competitive vra ~e must be frequent . Thi s is probably the 
ptron~est case for t he creation of labor monopol ies to avoid 
~onopsonistic Hage determ ination. One mi gh t conclude that in an 
~conomy v1ith lon g stret ches o f unemployment monopolistic labor 
co mbin ?v t i ons a r -::- n e c e ssary to offset the l a c1:: o f competition 
~mong the buyers of l abo r . It can be seen that in serious under-
emp lo yment l abor mob ility becarnes costly and the 1·n rker caD...not 
~ove fro m one e mployment to another. It is felt tJ:i..at this immo-
pility and conc ition of serious unemplo yment is not a cause of 
uhe lack o f competition a mong employers but t h e e ffect of the 
' a.c k of competition among vrorkers \··rh o ha ve co mbined to ho l d their 
m~e r a t e s a t a level Hhich h indere. f u ll empl oym ent. Thus it 
~ay b e concluded tha t dur i n g the depress ion phase of the busine ss 
t ycle the re woul C ord,lnarily be unemployment and an accompanying 
ac k of empl oyers ' co mpe tition for vro r ke rs. If, however, t h is 
nsuff iciency o f emplo yers' c ompe tition for vwr lre r s is "o f f set 11 
·J ~ restricting laborers' co mpetition for jobs and their mobility, 
~ond. it ions may arise under 1·1hi ch the tenden cy to vmr d underemplo y -
pent is perpe tuated. 
As a n a tural result, t h e important issue _, is, to vJhat exten:, 
does multi - e mp loyer bargaining , as an exten sion of collective 
bargaining , hinder t he free flo v1 of labor to the plants offering 
hi ghest 'T:iage rates ~ The ans"\o'Jer is one o f the more important cri 
ticisms o f this t ype of bargaining . 
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S~nce t h is is a l a r ge country , t he re are very l a r ge variati ns 
in p ro du ctim msts b e t 1:1e en major and minor d istricts and e ven 
within a n d betwe en these are as . The company in a h i gh - vm ge area 
may find itself denied ac cess to the l a bor ma r ket if its wage 
rates are held down by the weight of t h e rest o f the industry. 
Usuall y , hoVJever, multi-emplo yer bargaining pressures rates up 
to those of' t he h i ghe st, and t hen the company in a lo v.;-wa ge area 
has the p ick of_ the local labor market but loses the lo vJer \;ra ges 
v-.rhich may have compensated in the past for some disadvantage in-
herent in the location. Moreover, ·being forced to pa y much high 
er rates than the rest o f th~ community does not make for popu-
l a ri ty vJi th other manufacturers or for community coopera tion. Ii 
some industries the geo graphical varia tions in cost are so great 
that multi-emplo ye r bargaining seems impractical without destroy 
ing ce rtain se gments of the indv_stry . I'hus vlith area a n d geo -
a:rauhical dif f ere nces v1iped out, free a ccess to t he labor marke t 
'-' -
and mobility m~y be hindered while local va ria tions in econom ic 
and so cia l factors are ignore d . 
The l a st criticism is p resented as a n inherent fault of mul 
ti-emplo yer bargaining . Thi s is the possibility o f the severity 
as we ll a s t he number of s trikes increa sing . Be cause of the 
difficul tv o f rec oncil in <Z manv_ conf1 ictina: viewpoints it often 
happens that a company coul d reach a s reement with a union indivi 
dually ·where it cannot as part of a multi-employer bargaining 
group. Stri ke s often occur over small problems which can be 
avoided b y ne got i atin g s kill and understand ing . The character 
of the ne gotiators an d the s piri t brou ght to the conference tabl 
are important. 'rhis is more d ifficult to establish on an indus-
try basis. Hulti-employer bargaining i ncreases unionization and 
s trengt1~ens unions. By means of 1 t unions can bargain for all 
persons in an industry w.i thout the ne cessity of organizing all 
wor kers or having representa tion in all pl ants . ~Vi th greater 
str•ength there is s ometimes mo re of an inclination ! to strike. 
Labor f:lierarchies organized for political povrer can be developed 
in the process, and this centralization may lead to local di s-
sa tis faction because some vw rkers may refuse to abide by terms 
the y had .little or no voice in establishing . Thus there is vride 
spread fear t.ha t mult i-employer bargaining is a weapon in the 
hands of ei t her management or l abo r that may lead to an increase 
in t he severity an d scope of industrial warfare. Observers are 
p.fraid t hat the f eeling of poiver which this type o f barga ining 
gives to management and labor forces arrayed a gainst each other 
wi ll tempt t hem t o be unyielding in negotiat ions, though the ris1 
~nd costs of a strike are so great a s to induce co mpromises. 
rhere is particularly great anxiety t hat Hork stoppages resultine 
from a failure of multi -employer collective bargaining 1.vill af-
fect not only the conflicting parties but also the gene ral we l-
fare through interruption of essential services. 
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Dl 
In su mmary, the evaluation has tende d to shO"~tl cel"ta in ten-
dencies to v-1ards positions ind icated by both the su pporters and 
critics of multi-employer bargaining. There is certainly enough 
tendency in e ither direction t o me rit firm po s itions peing t aken 
nd an ultimate stand mi ght vre ll depend on the individual's basi · 
philosophy and background . 
Eevertheless, a stron s case can be made for the supporters 
of thi s t ype of bargaining who feel that previously the union ha 
ot reache d an equal position Hith management at the bargaining 
able and multi-employer bargaining enabled them to achieve this 
position . Equal l y strong is t he advanta3e this bargaining accor s 
' to those ~'1ho feel that stability is important in t he LYJ.dustry an 
hat any co mpetition based on exploitat.ion of the v1a ges should 
ibe eliminated . Lastly , a 'firm stan d can be justified by those 
,-.rho feel t'b...a t t h is bar saining can help preserve uniform conce rte 
r ction with a united front and develop a community of interest 
ibet1.> een labor and management. 
As r egards the disadvantages e qually strong argu.ments . can 
oe ac:tvanced. 'rhe strongest i s s u e pointed out as a :_limitation is 
n ot only the a ctual perpet ration of monopolistic action but also 
I he i mplicat ion of future ha rm to t l1.e public interest . Along wi 
uh is, the critics feel that the vlip ing out o f vJa .;e an.d area 
.ifferentials v1i ll tend t o hinder mobility of labor and !.gnore 
ocal variations in e cono mic and social factors. Finally, the 
ast ~,re a lme ss is one that seems inherent in the very makeup of 
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this type of bargaining . This is the possibility of the strike · 
incidence and scope increasing and creating costs to the economy 
as a vlhole . 
In conclud. in ~ it is felt t i.l.at certain value judgments may 
!be presented . In may be that the a dvantages and disadvantages 
may outvTeigh each other at d ifferent times . There is evidence 
t o ind icate tha~ the initial advantage is almost ent irely to the 
~nion but that as time goe s on the situation tends to approach 
r n equilibrium . I'~anagement has the ability to ana l yze the oper-
r tion of bargain ins by larger units and to develo p vJays and. mean ~ 
of making the pro cess an equitable one, just as has been done 
in other countries . Thus if industry o rgan ize s on a permanent 
basis for the purpose of standardization , industry will be ready 
~or vrhateve r development occurs in collective bargaining , ivhethe:t 
pn a community, area , regional, or indus try-1:1ide bas is· ~ 
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CRA.P'rER 6 
S UMJ1ARY AND CON CLUS IONS 
This chapter proposes to summar-ize the thesis, restating th 
fin d ings of the pre ceding chapters to s how succinctly the more 
im portan t f l. nd ings of t he vlhole s t udy. Certain conclusions viill 
be stated and metho ds of improvement of multi-employer bargain in , 
will be pointed out. 
In de fining and des cribing multi-employer bargainin g stru c- ~ 
ture s, it was found that t here ·were certain basic type s of agree 
ments , covering in sco pe industries, re g ions, and local sys tems. 
Along v'l i t h these bargaining_ structures s imilar in me thod v1ere 
presented. On the basis of investigation , it was estimated 
that the numbe r of W:J rkers cove re d by these a gr e ements and simi-
1ar types approximated four million 1-vor ke rs. In terms of sco pe , 
bargaining vms dispersed t hrou gh al l types of industries, includ 
ing manufacturing , extractive and service. A final conclusion 
i'rould be that it v1as diffi cult to d~ f1ne and class ify agreements 
into certain specific stratifications and in many cases it vras 
more feasible to use a functio na l approach and class ify the 
a greement in the most li ke ly cate gory rather t han adhere strong l 
to a strict classification that mi ght not be the general positio 
of the agreement. 
In reviev;in g the c.;rowth o f mu l ti -employer bargaining in 
certain selected i ndustries the · point was made that this type 
of bargaining made a ma Jor contribution to restoring pea ce and 
order in p reviously chaotic and d istressed industries. ·rhis 
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order and stabilizat ion, in varying degrees, was shown in t he 
various in dustries where despite certai~ obstacles, the problems 
were overcome and successful records of labor-management rela-
tions ·He re established ~ , To review briefly, these were obstacles :. 
such a s: techno lo g ical innova tion in t he gl a ss-bottle indust r y , 
employment o f ch ild labor in the stove industry, cutthroa t c om -
petition in the hosiery industry, and similar problems in the 
co a l and railroad industries. Despite these obstacles , on the 
basis of research , it was observed that although many other ec-
onomic factors aided fostering peaceful labor relations in these 
industries, one of t he largest contr i butions was the inception 
and ma intenance of multi-employer ·collective bargaining . 
In pointing ou t the administrative problems encountered in 
multi-employer a greements certain effects were noticed. Hera it 
was observed that t he re Y.Te re a varie ty of types of uniformity, 
which coul d be achieved un de r multi - employe r bargaining . I t was 
further observed that t he e conom ic e ffects of the t ype s presante
1 
i'lere qu ite d ifferent and pre sented prob lems quite 1.mali ke . Sinc 1 
it was assume d that those t ype s of uniformity are workable, the 
conclwsion ivas t ha t once the d ifficulties i.-Je re removed, 1t1age 
uniformity could be achieved thr ough cooperation o f l abor and 
management. Althou gh the problem seemed co mplicated and unreal 
the re were definite ind ications that, if industries want that 
t ype of bargaining , it is technically possible ana_ that it is no 
more unrea l or complicated than t he problem that piece rate sys-
terns presented, years ago . 
-=-=-=-=--=-= . __ _Bn.e-11_~ after evaluation of the advantages anq cl.i sadvanta • s 
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of multi-employer bargaining, and criticism of them in terms o f 
the economic pr inciple as a selected criterion, it was observed 
that there were conflicting vie'l'lpoints that seemed irreconcilabl , . 
It 11as finally concluded that although labor had the first ad-
vantage, once management organized on the same basis it was en-
tirely feasible for them to equate their bargaining po s ition 
with l a bor and go on from there to stable and orderly labor re-
lations . 
Certain issues can be pointed out in t he light of the in-
vestigation . The analysis tended to show that multi-employer 
bat-gaining seems to be a necessary stage of organization · in 
labor relations. It seems as though it creates the necessity of 
utilizing it rather than fighting it and the potentialities it 
offers would re~1ard management as vJell as labor • . 
From an overall po int of view, 1t appears that the ultimate 
success of multi-employer barga ining vJill depend on whether 
management and labor vlill accept t h is type of bargainin g as a 
working proposition and along with it the idea that there exists 
betvreen ther~ a community of interest as producers and an inter-
dependence vlhich makes conflict more wasteful than cooperation. 
Multi-employer bargaining can help in bringing this about and 
facilitate the o peration. It cannot be expected, hm'!ever, to do 
the job a l l by itself. 
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ABSTHACT 
This thesis proposes t o shoi,v t hat multi-employer bargaini:n_g 
offers a device for promo ting uniformity and stability in labor 
rela tions, grea tly lessening industria l strife and contribu ting 
materially to peaceful a nd mutually beneficial l abor relations. 
Certain methods , arbitrary in choi ce, were employed. In 
makins selections for pur~Jose s of illustration and analysis the 
criteria stressed were: (1) a sufficiently long period of ex-
perience with thes e selections, and (2) a wide variation in t he 
economic circumstances and experiences with t hese choices so 
tha t inst~1ctive analysis could be made. 
After the d iscussion of the problem and its validati6n, 
followed th ? definition and description of multi-employer bargal 1-
ing.agreernents . Here the basic types of bargaining ae;reements 
such as industry-vlide, re g i onal, and local a greements indicate a 
11ide izlariety of possibilities. Alon g v;i th the more conventional 
type we have similar a g reements not quite as s harply classified 
but similar enou gh to be d iscussed . The estimate of coverage 
indicates appro/xima tely four mill ion workers in all t ypes of in-
dustry ran g ing from manufacturin s to service industries. 
In a review of the growth of multi-employer bargaining whic 
began approximately in the 1 870's, chaotic and disorderly con-
ditions preceded the inception of t h i s t ype of bargaining. In 
certain i ndustries such as the g las s bottle, the stove industry, 
t he hosiery industry and in the coal mining and railroad indus-
tries multi --employer bargaining faced seemingly insurmountable 
obstacles . These obstacles included t he problems of' technologi-
cal innovation, employment of chil d labor, and cutthroat compe-
tition . Yet, this bargaining t e chnique made a major contributio 
in bringing peaceful a nd orderly l abor relations to t hese in-
dustries. 
There are problems encountere d in administering multi-em-
ployer agreements. These problems have certain varying effects 
on 11'lages, prices, dis tribution of t h e labor force and tech.11olo g i 
cal innovation. These ef f ects are different due to the various 
types of uniformity utilized in the a greements. However, once 
these administrative difficulties a re overcome, the problem of 
making multi-employer agreements workable will be no more B.if-
ficult than the problem that piece rate systems presented, years 
ago . 
In evaluating multi-employer barga ining , adva ntages- and 
disadvanta ges must be taken into consideration and in turn cri-
ticized in the l ight o f certain selected criteria . The advan-
tages of equalization of bargaining power, elimination of com-
petit ion based on v:age exploitation, and uniform concerted actio! 
have firm foundation . ~qually strong are the criticisms that 
multi-employer ba r gain ing is monopolistic, v:ipe s out geo graphica 
wage differentials while ignoring local varia tions in economic 
and social factors, . and finally causes the strike incidence and 
s cope to increase, creating harm to the public interest. It can 
be observed that des p ite all the confl icting viewpoints, once 
[mana ge ment is able to equate its bargaining po v1er with labor, 
which has the initial advanta ~e , stable and orderly ~ndustrial 
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relations will be the r e sult . 
In the light. of t he investigation certain issues mi ght be 
pointed out . Multi-employer bargaining seems to b e a necessary 
sta ge of organization in labor relations . It appears that it is 
more important to utilize this bargaining technique rather than 
fi ghting it. The potentialities offered seem t.o be able to re-
ward mana gement as well as labor. 
The overall point. of view indicates that t h e success of thi~ 
type of barga ining de pend s on whether manage ment a n cl labor see 
in it a wor kin g pro position, and are abl e to envision the idea 
that a communit y o f interest exists between them 1flhich makes 
conflict more wasteful than cooperation. Ivlulti-employer·bargain 
can acco mplish t h is cooperation but cannot be e xpected t o do the 
job all by itse lf. 
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